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ABSTRACT

Osman, Eisa Hassan Mohamed. MULTI-ROBOT AUCTION BASED
COORDINATION. (Major Advisor: Dr. Abdollah Homaifar) North Carolina
Agricultural and Technical State University. (Co-advisor: Dr. Albert Esterline) North
Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University.
This dissertation studied the coordination problem for a Task Initiator (TI) with
multiple ground stations (GSs). Each GS has a team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
that frequently collected data from a set of unattended ground sensors (UGSs) and
delivered it to the source ground station (GS). The GSs made the information available
to the TI. This problem formulated into a continuous, time-constrained version of the
multi- travelling salesmen problem. A market-based coordination mechanism is presented
that uses the concepts of price, revenue, cost, and a sequence of first-price, one-round
auctions between the TI and GSs from one side, and double auction between GSs and
UAVs from another side to distribute data collection tasks efficiently among team
members. In a dynamic environment, this approach promises robustness, adaptation, and
graceful degradation. Tasks from GS-to-UAV are double first-price sealed-bid
sequential procurement auctions possibly with (additional) subcontracting (negotiation)
and TI as a market matcher. To the author‘s knowledge, this is the first occurrence of
using double auction as a coordination method in robot industries.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In today‘s dynamic environment, the need of mapping a wider operational area
gains significant attention due to the sensitivity of the information needed at real-time to
the control unit such as in rescue, reconnaissance, and real- time surveillance operations.
This issue is particularly relevant in military applications. In situations where unattended
aerial vehicles (UAVs) need to communicate with a control unit, many problems arise
such as sensor ranges and bandwidth. Distributing multiple ground stations (GSs)
geographically will reduce the communication bottleneck, and simplify computation of
deployed information. Interactions between many ground stations, a task initiator (TI),
and UAVs become paramount, and require a special design to complete the mission
effectively. Based on knowledge of the economic area, incorporating different auction
approaches in engineering fields has helped resolve such issues. In this problem, single
first-price sealed-bid sequential procurement auctions used between the TI and ground
stations and double first-price sealed-bid sequential procurement auctions possibly with
(additional) subcontracting (negotiation) from ground stations to UAVs.
This chapter provides a general overview of the research work, and an overview
of each chapter in this dissertation.
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1.1 Multi-UAVs and Data Collection
The rapid growth of sensor technologies in recent years has enabled scientists to
solve complicated or difficult problems in many applications, such as the battlefield.
Various mission tasks, such as target detection, reconnaissance and surveillance, and
situation awareness include the major area of applicatio ns of unattended ground sensors
(UGS) technologies.
In the robotic field, scientists follow different approaches when dealing with task
allocation. There are three principal approaches to deal with task allocation, namely,
centralized, distributed, and market-base. In a centralized approach, the robotic team is
treated as a single system with many degrees of freedom. The leader or manager has the
ability to plan for the entire team that requires the follower to inform the leader with their
information to enable a manager to carry out actions. Since the leader has all the
knowledge about the environment, the leader can perfectly allocate tasks based on this
knowledge. The centralized approach produces optimal or near optimal results at the
expense of high computational overhead and is prone to malfunctioning.
Overcoming the shortcoming of the centralized approach has encouraged
scientists to come up with the idea of a distributed system. In this approach, distributing
the responsibility of planning to the whole team reduces the communication bottleneck,
and response to dynamic conditions is faster.
In general, this system is robust, and no single point of failure can occur.
Conversely, basing the decision only on local information the results in general are highly
sub-optimal. Preserving the advantages of centralized and distributed approaches,
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scientists migrates ideas from economic areas to overcome the disadvantages of these
approaches, which led to the birth of market-based coordination. Market-based
coordination is based on the free market economic model. Essentially, the competition
between members is to maximize their profit. Members under this system usually
compete to achieve their goals and sometimes negotiation with other team members to
reach their goals.
A market-based approach accommodates multiple auctioneers who distribute an
incoming information load among themselves. There are three types of auctions for
acquiring a commodity, namely, English auction, Dutch auction, first-price sealed-bid
auction, and second-price sealed-bid auction. In an English auction, an ―ascending‖
movement of a potential buyer bids occur until the bidding stops. The winning bidder
receives the item at the highest price, which could be less than its maximum valuation;
however, is not always the case because bidders may tend to overbid, which causes the
item to exceed its true valuation (Fasli, 2007).
The Dutch auction is an open, ―descending,‖ bid auction designed to handle
multiple identical items (usually in a lot). In this auction, the seller sets an opening price.
If no bids are made, the price is lowered until a bid is received. The first bidder wins the
first option of buying all or part of the lot. The bidder may lose the item if he/she waits
too long to enter their bid.
In a first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), each bidder submits a sealed bid
without knowing other bidders' valuation of the item, which reflects a private valuation
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for the auctioned item. In this auction, the highest bidder is the winner and pays the
amount of his/her bid (Fasli, 2007).
In a second-price sealed-bid auction, each participant submits a sealed bid. The
highest bidder wins the auction, and only pays the price of the second highest bid.
Therefore, it is the bidder‘s advantage to bid his/her true valuation of the item.
A double auction is an environment where multiple buyers and sellers participate
to trade a commodity. In this environment, each buyer and seller submits a bid
representing his/her offer to sell or buy the auctioned commodity. Then, submitted bids
are matched, and afterwards the auction is cleared. Double auction, in this context, is a
two-sided auction; one side represents a centralized approach while the other side
represents a distributed approach, allowing the market to compute the information in an
efficient manner while providing quick responses.
As in battlefields, providing quick responses is a key factor when transmitting
data back and forward to the TI. A TI could also be a control room or an agent with the
ability to initiate tasks. Transmitting data are also a challenge when connectivity is an
issue or when there are limited communication ranges such as unmanned ground sensors
(UGSs) and large distances between UGSs and the TI. However, task allocation through
multiple ground stations (GSs) is more cost effective than single GSs for mapping wider
areas and acquiring better robustness.
To improve reliability, performance, and the cost of task allocation, logically one
should consider a market-based coordination mechanism such as a free market economic
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model, which provides better results for optimizing distance data delivery from multiple
UGSs.
Multiple GSs, in this context, will provide an excellent opportunity to overcome
communication problems or sensor range limitations by forming a chain of
communication to receive information from a further distance, reduce communication
bottleneck, provide relief or reduce computation complexity for the control center (Moore
et al., 2005).
When using double auction, the TI, GSs, and UAVs formulate layers of
communications that provide quick responses in a robust environment to benefit from the
market-based mechanism.

1.2 Dissertation Scope
The focus of this research is two- fold:
1. The coordination problem of task initiator (TI), ground stations (GSs) and a team
of UAVs that is employed to frequently visit a set of remote UGSs, collect data
from them, and return to the ground station to deliver the collected data. As
mentioned earlier, the importance of time as a factor can be realized when GSs
receive this data. A time constraint on data delivery is one of the concerns of this
dissertation. The deadline limit on data delivery time should not exceed a specific
time in order to validate the accuracy of the data. In particular, to achieve any
task, the time between two successive tasks should not exceed a certain deadline
time. This constraint is imposed by the nature of the UGS applications (as in
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target detection and situation awareness), in which late-delivered data will lose its
sensitive value and may not be useful anymore and may result in hazardous
situations, and
2. The problem of assigning tasks when the environment has multiple GSs and
multiple UAVs with full degree of freedom.
UAVs are responsible for accomplishing tasks such as tracking enemy targets in
battlefields or gathering information from UGS. In these scenarios, the UAVs must
coordinate their actions with GSs, usually through communication, in order to achieve
their goals. The UAVs must make independent decisions based on their perception of the
environment, and act in a manner that optimize the global utility.
Resources (utilities) or energy consumption is a constraint that the coordination
system should satisfy. Optimizing the average distance traveled of performing any task
should be part of the coordination methods. Under these conditions, this problem
formulated as a continuous and time constrained version of the multi- traveling salesmen
problem (MTSP).
Recent studies showed that multi-agent systems operating in dynamic
environments such as surveillance, reconnaissance, and battlefields are highly prone to
failures of many kinds, and it is crucial that the coordination method that deals with such
kind of environment be robust to these failures (Ajorlou et al., 2007 and Dias et al.,
2004).
Introducing the distributed coordination system helps to understand operating in
this type an environment. Market based coordination is one mechanism that have an
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effective usage in an environment in which frequent auctioning, time limited contracts,
and time-dependent prices ensure robustness in the face of loss of team members and
failures of individuals (Dias et al., 2004).
Stentz and Dias (2003) in TraderBots market-based coordination approach cited
the work of (Smith, 1980) in Contract Net Protocol, the implementation of contract net
protocol by (Sandholm, 1993), and an extension of it by (Sandholm and Lesser, 1995).
These concepts were used to control different dynamic environment systems. Stentz and
Dias (1999) proposed a market-based approach for multi-robot coordination, which aims
to exploit the desirable properties of both distrib uted and centralized approaches. In
order to take advantage of such approaches, (Dias et al., 2004) proposed a distributed task
allocation protocol that uses the concepts of cost, revenue, and profit that efficiently
distribute available tasks among team members through a sequence of multiple different
auctions. In this environment, each agent is self- interested in maximizing their personal
profit, which can lead to a near global optimal plan for the entire team provided the costs
and price functions are well defined. Generally, in this kind of task allocation, the cost of
the task will determine its priority among other tasks. Adding a new task will be
constrained to the due time of other tasks on the agent‘s current plan. So the lower the
cost, the more demand needed to perform it. It is clear that the task‘s cost is not always
the main factor. In some situations, a task will be given higher priority even though it has
a high execution cost compared to other tasks due to the sensitivity of task‘s information
at the time.
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Negotiation between UAVs after clearing the auction will improve system
efficiency by reducing the cost to participating agents. Because of the agents‘ interest,
they will try to maximize their profit and reduce their cost. By design, the auction can
accommodate a situation where an agent auctioned a task earlier even when the agent was
not bidding during the auction time because this agent is deemed fittest to perform the
task. In a system-optimized model, different negotiations produce the same result.
Frequent auctioning will accommodate the recovery of task(s) timed out due to agent
failure or death; reallocating these tasks to new agents will cause the system to be robust
and guarantee the delivery of all auctioned tasks.

1.3 Overvie w of Chapters
Chapter 2 gives a general overview of the basic concepts in market-based
coordination including auction mechanisms, types, and approaches. It also provides a
literature review. Chapter 3 focuses on the problem formulation and methodology.
Particular emphasis is on different auction structures. Issues related to cost estimation
and robustness are also discussed. Presented in Chapter 4 are the simulation results, and
the performance of the double auction. The dissertation concludes with Chapter 5, which
provides concluding comments and possible improvements.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Relevant Work
Multi-robot coordination has received much attention in the last few decades.
This is due to the demand for automation in application domains where multiple robots
can accomplish the same tasks more efficiently than a single robot. With a team of
coordinated robots, tasks achievement is faster, safer, better than a single robot, and can
accomplish operations that a single robot cannot execute alone (Lemair et al., 2004).
Accordingly, coordinating multiple robots to complete a task cooperatively is a difficult
problem that has attracted much attention from the robotics research community. Based
on the manner in which team members interact, multi-robot coordination mechanisms can
be categorized into two groups: intentional swarm type cooperation. Deneubourg, et al.,
(1991) mentioned that in swarm-type robotic systems, numerous homogeneous
autonomous robots interact directly by exchanging their information with one another or
by acting on their environment; this collective activity may produce coordinated
behavior. In contrast to this, there is an intentional coordination, in which agents
negotiate explicitly and exchange task related information. The motivation behind this
kind of coordination is to satisfy mutual interest.
Lemair et al., (2004) mentioned that the potential applications of this kind of
coordination range from mapping missions of buildings or in a natural environment,
rescue or intervention missions in hazardous areas to planetary exploration or deployment
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of equipment without human intervention. A system supported with several robots to
perform a given mission should be flexible enough to allow robots to allocate tasks to
each other and build their plans accordingly to complete the missio n. They should also
be able to modify the allocation dynamically and consequently to their plans to adapt to
changes in their environment or to new requests issued by the operator. However, the
system must also satisfy the limited constraints on energy resources and communication
ranges.
In their TraderBots, (Dias et al., 2004) mentioned that multi-agent systems
operating in dynamic environments such as battlefields must accommodate many kinds
of failures, frequent dynamical changes, and uncertain or imperfect information.
Therefore, it is crucial that any kind of coordination methods applied for multi-agent
systems be able to function well under such conditions. Market based coordination was
derived from a category of intentional coordination mechanis ms, and is a promising
method for handling these conditions. Frequent auctioning, time limited contracts, and
time-dependent prices ensure robustness in the loss of team members and individual
failures, which also enable the team to get by with uncertainty and online tasks
introduced over time (Dias et al., 2004, and 2005). The distributed nature of marketbased coordination enables the team to rely on local knowledge so they can respond
quick and fast to dynamic changes within their environment without the need of a central
planner. Since information is decomposed into bids, the market-based coordination
systems can communicate efficiently and compute efficiently due to the parallelism.
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During the last two decades, coordination mechanisms for multi-robot task
allocation have been developed that are based on market-base coordination. The M+
(Botelho and Alami, 1999) architecture, based on a greedy algorithm, was the first
market-based approach to multi- robot task allocation. The MURDOCH (Gerkey and
Mataric, 2002), as a completely distributed system, offers a distributed approximation to
a global optimum of resource usage, which is equivalent to an instantaneous greedy
scheduler. An online task assignment algorithm also assigns a newly created task to the
fittest available robot (Gerkey and Mataric, 2004). TraderBots models (Dias et al., 2004)
represent a multi-robot team as an economy of self- interested agents that try to maximize
their individual profits. In these models, reallocating tasks allow for solution
improvements over initial assignments, and for adapting task assignments as new
information is ascertained.
In this dynamic environment, agents who have the ability of planning for
themselves and negotiating may do so by swapping some tasks (as self- interested agents).
This redistribution of tasks and resources simultaneously at the end result in lower cost
solutions, which imply some profit, and therefore will improve efficiency. Given
appropriate costs and revenue functions, this method can lead to a near globally optimal
allocation. Constrained tasks will not be dealt with in TraderBots where interrelated
costs among the tasks are considered. Hoplites (Karla et al., 2005) seem to be the first
market based approach to constrained task execution. In Hoplites, passive coordination
produces locally developed solutions since agents frequently exchange information of
their intended actions and locally select their actions. In a situation where there is a
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constraint violation, agents actively propose and bid on joint plans to resolve the
constraint. The performance of Hoplites is validated in perimeter sweeping (Karla et al.,
2005) and, more recently, in constrained exploration (Karla et al., 2006), during
exploration of a hazardous area, robots are restricted to remain in communication with
the base station directly or through a chain of teammates. Lemaire et al. (2004) put soft
time constraints on subtasks of a complex task to synchronize subtask execution. To
define the cost of a plan for tasks, needed are the sum of the distance cost of the plan and
a cost term corresponding to the quality of the time-constraint satisfaction. Agents,
therefore, will try to reduce the deviation from the expected execution time while trading
tasks.
The price of a task determines the cost the auctioneer will pay an agent that
accomplishes the task. Using time- varying prices, the auctioneer announces higher prices
for tasks that have become more important. Therefore, bids reflect not only the agents'
costs but also the importance of the tasks.

2.2 Market-based Coordination
This section briefly explains the basic concepts of market-based coordination
mechanisms.
2.2.1 Overview
In market-based coordination methods, participants form an economy that
allocates tasks to members through auctions. Normally, a user or team members that
have task creation capability (Dias, et al., 2005) generate tasks. An auctioneer offers all
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its available tasks to other agents in its environment, collects their bids, evaluates the
collected bids, and assigns some or all of its tasks to them. As discussed in the previous
section, some market-based coordination systems allow reassignment of a task. This
means that an agent in charge of performing a task have the ability to rese ll that task to
another agent, e.g., TraderBots (Dias et al., 2004), M+ (Botelho and Alami,1999), the
system presented in (Ajorlou et al., 2007), and Sandholm's implementation of the contract
net protocol (Sandholm, 1993). In such systems, any team member can negotiate with
teammates to improve their personal profit as a self- interested agent. An agent who
offered a task may submit a bid on it. A submitted bid in this context represents the cost
to the agent for performing the offered task. The global objective of the application and
resource consumption are two main factors in bid valuation. By assigning the tasks to
team members through a bidding process, the auctioneer tries to lower the overall team
cost by allocating the tasks to team members with lower costs.
2.2.2 Instantaneous Assignment (IA) vs. Time-extended Assignment (TA)
Gerkey and Mataric (2002) categorized multi-robot task allocation mechanisms
based on instantaneous assignment (IA) and time extended assignment (TA). In IA,
robots do not have the ability to plan for their future activities, which mean the available
information concerning the robots, the tasks, and the environment permits only an
instantaneous allocation of tasks to robots, with no planning for future allocations.
Therefore, the agents can only buy or sell one task at a time, which indicates that there is
no room for parallelism. This type of allocation mechanism is useful for the applications
in which tasks are introduced to the system online such as MURDOCH (Gerkey and
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Mataric 2002), first-price auctions (Dias et al., 2003), and dynamic role assignment
(Gerkey and Mataric, 2004).
In TA, agents have more information about the environment, such as the set of all
tasks that needs an assignment, or a model of how tasks are expected to arrive over time.
In this type of assignment, agents are allowed to make plans for the future by accepting
more than one task at a time.
2.2.3 Auction Mechanisms
This section describes various types of auctions. In particular, how auctions differ
and how auctioneers function within them.
2.2.3.1 Procurement Auction
A procurement auction, also called reverse auction, is a type of auction in which
the role of the buyer and seller are reversed. The primary objective here is to drive
purchase prices downward. In this kind of auction, sellers compete to obtain business. In
a procurement auction, a buyer puts up a request to purchase a particular item. Multiple
sellers bid to sell the requested item and the winner of the auction is the se ller who offers
the lowest price (www.wordiq.com/definition/Procurement_auction). In a procurement
auction, the bidders seek a higher clearing price, and the auctioneer seeks a lower one.
2.2.3.2 Double Auction
Dynamic pricing mechanisms, and especially auctions with multiple buyers and
sellers, are becoming popular in electronic commerce. ―Double auction‖ refers to a
market system where multiple buyers and sellers submit their bids for standardized units
of well-defined items or securities by stating how much and at what price they will trade.
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In double auction, each trader can express the subjective preference for the traded goods
by using a utility function. Thus, properly defining the utility for representing each
trader's preference is an important issue for research on double auction. Double auctions
occur in an environment that has one commodity in the market with multiple buyers and
sellers each submitting a single bid to buy or sell one unit of the commodity. According
to (Fasli, 2007) the general process is as follows:
Both buyer and sellers submit their bids.
Bids rank from highest to lowest to generate demand and supply profiles.
From the profiles, the maximum quantity exchanged can be determined by
matching selling offers with demands bids.
The transaction price is set and the market clears.
In this auction, each GS will sell only one task at a time, and any UAV will bid
for only one task at a time. Each bidder has a private utility value for the item, which
represents its real cost to perform such a task. The utility value from buyers‘,
(respectively, sellers‘) point of view is the most (respectively, least) prices that they are
willing to pay to buy (respectively, sell) the task. Although all market agents are selfinterested, agents formulate their bids is based on the truthful value of the item.
A double auction could be either periodic or continuous. In a continuous double
auction, buyers and sellers are matched immediately on detection of compatible bids,
while in periodic double auction bids are collected over a specified period of time after
which the market will be cleared.
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2.2.3.3 Combinatorial Auction
A combinatorial auction is one where buyers and sellers have preferences on
packages or bundles of commodities rather than only on one particular commodity at
time. In this auction, bids are considered for combinations of different commodities.
Consider a case where a set S of n tasks offered to the team members. Each agent
calculates the cost of performing each subset of S, and submits a bid on that subset. After
receiving all bids, the auctioneer evaluates them, and finds the partition of S with
minimum cost. Bid calculation and winner determination are NP hard, which makes the
combinatorial auctions intractable.
2.2.3.4 Parallel Auction
In parallel auctions, a set S of n tasks offered to the team members. Each agent
calculates the cost of performing any of the offered tasks individually and submits a bid.
The auctioneer then assigns each task to the agent that has s ubmitted the lowest bid.
Parallel auctions do not account for the dependencies among the tasks.
2.2.3.5 Sequential Auction
In sequential auctions, the set S of n tasks assigned through a sequence of n
auctions, where only one task is sold in each auctio n. During each auction, each agent
computes the cost of adding each unsold task to its current plan. Then, the task with the
lowest cost is assigned to a corresponding bidder. Clearly, submitting bids for all the
tasks offered will create communication complexity; but, since only one task is assigned
during each auction cycle, it is in the best interest of each bidder to submit a bid only for
the task that cost less among all auctioned tasks. This will have an impact of reducing the
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communication bottleneck and increase the bidder‘s chance of winning the auctioned
task.
Calculating marginal cost (the cost of adding a new task to the current plan) is NP
hard in the MTSP case since it requires re-planning for the new set of tasks. In the
heuristic used by (Ajorlou et al., 2007), a new task will be inserted between each two
successive tasks into the agent plan to find the minimum cost of the new generated plan,
which is the current plan. The difference between the current plan and the old one is the
cost of performing the new task.
2.2.4 Auction Types
In a single attribute or a one-side auction, agents negotiate over one item, which is
available by itself as a whole and not in combination. The negotiation has one
dimension, usually price, and the relationship between buyers and sellers takes the form
of one-to-one, one-to-many or many-to- many relationships.
2.2.4.1 Ascending-bid Auction (English Auction)
The English auction is the most common type of auction where the winning
bidder receives the item at the highest price. The auction uses upward or ―ascending‖
movement of potential buyer bids until the bidding stops. Bids may be oral, signaled,
written or by third-party proxy in which one item or groups of items can be auctioned.
Auction periods vary but are generally short. Items are frequently displayed to potential
bidders prior to the auction with the reserve prices cited. E-Bay is a good e-commerce
application of this type auction.
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2.2.4.2 Descending-bid Auction (Dutch Auction)
The Dutch auction is an open, ―descending‖ bid auction designed to handle
multiple, identical items (usually in a lot). In this type auction, the seller sets an opening
price. If no bids are made, the price is lowered until a bid is received. This first bidder
wins the first option of buying all or a part of the lot. Other bidders have an opportunity
to buy once the demand at that price is exhausted. Additional bidders may bid a lower
price. This cycle continues until the lot is gone.
2.2.4.3 First-price Sealed-bid Auction
In a first price sealed bid auction (FPSB), each bidder submits a sealed bid that
reflects its private valuation for the auctioned item without knowing other bidders‘
valuations of the item. In this auction, the highest bidder is the winner and pays the
amount of his/her bid. There are two distinctive phases (Fasli, M. 2007):
1. The bidder phase in which participants submit their bids.
2. The resolution phase in which the bids are opened and the winner is determined.
2.2.4.4 Second-price Sealed-bid Auction (Vickery Auction)
The second-price sealed-bid auction was named after William Vickery, a 1996
Nobel Prize recipient (Economics). In this type auction, each participant submits a sealed
bid. The highest bidder wins the auction but only pays the price of the second highest
bid. This auction fosters a bid strategy that reflects the buyer‘s true valuation of the item.
The Vickery approach gives all competing buyers an incentive to disclose their true best
price since they can safely bid a price that would yield zero profit. The process can be
used in a reverse auction method with the cheapest price winning but paying the second
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lowest bid price.
2.2.5 Auction Approaches
Normally, targets are scattered in the environment and the number of UAVs may
be more or less than the number of targets available. In either case, an efficient task
allocation method is needed for assigning UAVs to the targets. An efficient task
allocation strategy should complete the mission (that is, delivering the target information
to the GSs) in minimum time by direct assignment from the GSs or through negotiation
with other UAVs in communication range. The classical solution for a task allocation
problem would be to apply a centralized task allocation algorithm that generates the
necessary commands for UAVs. However, centralized task allocations have well known
limitations. Hence, there is a necessity to develop a decentralized task allocation
algorithm. Here, briefly discussed are the concepts of centralized and distributed task
allocation to assign tasks to UAVs.
2.2.5.1 Centralized Approaches
With centralized approaches, one agent (the leader) is responsible for planning for
the entire team, while simultaneously taking into account the environment and the
interactions of all team members at all times. All agents report to the leader and execute
the plan. Although the centralized approach generates an optimal solution under the
assumption that the information from the agents is available, it is intractable for a team of
UAVs due to the complexity of operations (Karla et al., 2006, Sariel et al., 2006).
Coordinating more than a few agents in the centralized approach causes a heavy
communication load, and a problem with the bandwidth due to restrictions on the
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network. This approach is slow to incorporate new environmental information since new
information must be sent back to the planner who re-computes the entire team‘s plan,
usually at significant computational expense. Finally, a centralized approach does not
allow a quick adaptation to change and tends to be brittle to failure. Primarily,
centralized approaches have been used loosely in coordinated systems for task allocation
(Sariel et al., 2006). Thus, centralized approaches are best suited for applications where
teams are small and the environment is static or global state information is easily
available.
2.2.5.2 Distributed Approaches
In a distributed approach, agents act independently and make decisions with local
information about their state and their environment. For example, the UAV work with
the ground stations or the central units such as TI to conduct their own plans based on
available information. Here the role of the central control or ground station is for
auctioning the task to the agents, evaluating received bids and awarding the winner agent.
This approach tends to be more robust to failure, allowing for greater flexibility and
tractability, and efficient for computation and communication. However, the solution
remains sub-optimal. To emphasize the benefits of centralized approaches in distributed
systems, market-based approaches have been designed to centrally plan over small
subsets of the team where time and resources permit (Dias et al., 2004 and 2003).
In market-based frameworks, agents model an economy of self- interested
individuals that buy and sell tasks and resources to maximize personal profit (Dias et al.,
2005). This redistribution of tasks and resources simultaneously results in lower cost
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solutions for the team. Most of the distributed task allocations use an explicit
communication message, which means that agents make decisions based on inter-agent
communications transmitted at different times. This characteristic makes the algorithms
more efficient, and with a higher level of fault tolerance than a centralized approach due
to its distributed nature.
Negotiation over the distributed system generates a step-wise improvement.
Negotiation techniques based on market rules (i.e., market-based approaches) fall within
the distributed algorithms that make use of explicit communication. These techniques
have received significant attention (Dias et al., 2006) since they offer a good compromise
between communication requirements and the quality of the allocation.
2.2.5.3 Market-based Approaches
A task allocation algorithm can be a method of distributing common resources.
Humans have dealt with similar problems for thousands of years with increasingly
sophisticated market economies in which the individual pursuit of profit leads to the
redistribution of resources and an efficient production of output. Therefore, market based
approaches make use of the principles of the market economy and apply them to multiagent coordination. This idea started with the Contract Net Protocol or CNP (Smith,
1980), which allocates tasks through negotiation of contracts. In this virtual economy,
agents are traders, tasks are traded commodities, and virtual money acts as currency.
Agents compete, despite being teammates in reality, to win tasks by participating in
auctions that produce efficient distributions based on specified preferences. When the
system is designed appropriately, each agent acts to maximize its individual profit, and
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simultaneously improves the efficiency of the team. This is the foundation of the success
of the market-based approach; one engineers the costs, revenues, and auction
mechanisms in such a way that individual self- interest leads to global efficient solutions.
Generally, a multi-agent coordination approach is a market-based approach if it
satisfies the following requirements (Dias et al., 2006):
The team is given a number of tasks that are achievable by individuals or subteams. To execute these tasks, the team has at its disposal a limited set of
resources (robot capacities) that the team distributes among its members.
A global objective quantifies the system designer‘s preferences for all possible
solutions.
An individual utility function specified for each agent quantifies that agent‘s
preferences for its individual resource usage and contributions towards the
team objective. Evaluating this function cannot require global or perfect
information about the state of the team or team objective.
A mapping is defined between the team objective function and individual or
sub-team utilities. This mapping addresses how the individual production and
consumption of resources and individuals‘ advancement of the team objective
affect the overall solution.
Resources and individual or sub-team objectives can be redistributed using a
mechanism such as an auction.
The core of market-based approach can be observed from where the auction
mechanism is. This mechanism can be divided in two phases, namely, a bidding phase
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and the winner determination phase. In the former, tasks are evaluated using a utility
function, which does not require the use of global information. In the latter phase, after
receiving the different bids, a task awarding mechanism is applied in order to choose the
most suitable agent for the task under auction. Moreover, these two phases consider the
participation of two roles: auctioneer and bidders. The bidding phase starts with either TI
or GS offering a task to the rest of the bidders. After receiving the announcement, they
should reply with their bids based on their capacity to execute that task (utility function).
The bidding phase is finish when the auctioneer receives all the bids. Next, the winner
determination phase starts. The auctioneer applies a mechanism that awards the task to
one of the bidders. Finally, the winner will add the task to his/her execution list. Marketbased task allocation algorithms do not limit the number of auctioneers and more than
one can operate at the same time. The main concepts that define a task allocation
mechanism based on auctions are: global objective, utility function, and task awarding
mechanism.
The global objective defines the team‘s goal to be optimized by coordinating all
agents. Different global objective functions can be considered (Tovey et al., 2005)
described the sum of the utilities, the maximum of all the utilities, and the average of the
utilities. The sum of utilities is used in scenarios where it is important to minimize the
total energy consumed by the team of agents. The maximum of all the utilities is used in
scenarios where it is fundamental to minimize the time needed to execute all tasks. Both
objectives have been used in multi-agent exploration scenarios. On the other hand, the
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average of the utilities used in search-and-rescue scenarios where it is important to
minimize how long on average it takes to execute a task.
The utility function is used to evaluate tasks and calculate bids. This function is
composed of the reward and cost functions as indicated in Chapter 3. The reward
function indicates the benefit of executing a task, and the cost function gives an estimate
of the effort to accomplish the same task.
The most common task awarding mechanism is to allocate a task to the agent with
the highest utility or lowest cost considering all received bids. As mentioned before,
there is a connection between the individual utility function, the task awarding
mechanism and the global objective. The system designer‘s responsibility is to choose a
utility function, and an awarding mechanism that leads to an efficient global solution.
Tovey et al., 2005 explained the systematic methods for deriving appropriate utility
functions and awarding mechanisms for each of the global objectives.
Finally, other properties that allow for characterization of a market-based task
allocation algorithm are described:
Multiple Robot Single Task (MRST) algorithms and Multiple Robots Multiple
Tasks (MRMT) algorithms: MRST algorithms do not make use of local
execution plans, and therefore, they are suited for applications where task
costs may change through time. However, the allocations are usually less
efficient allocations than MRMT algorithms, which use local plans to increase
the information used in the bid calculation. It can be said that MRST and
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MRMT algorithms have a capacity constraint equal to one and greater than
one respectively (Koenig et al., 2007).
With and without reallocations: when reallocations are not considered, the
same robots that initially allocated tasks execute tasks. On the other hand,
when a task allocation algorithm considers reallocations, it means that in order
to increase the efficiency of the final allocation, a robot could re-announce its
already allocated task or tasks.
Combinatorial or single- item auctions: in most of the task allocation
algorithms, each auction process only considers a single task. In
combinatorial auctions, each auction can involve more than one task.
Therefore, bids are calculated for bundles of tasks (Zheng et al., 2007).
Coordinated or loosely coupled tasks: when the execution of tasks is
completely independent from the rest, this is termed loosely coupled.
However, if the execution of tasks depends on others, tasks are coordinated.
This fact should be taken into account in the task allocation algorithm in order
to avoid execution deadlocks.
Sequential and parallel auctions: when only one auction runs at a time, the
task allocation algorithm is sequential. On the other hand, if more than one
auction can be performed simultaneously, they are executed in parallel. When
parallel auctions are used, the system‘s designer must be aware of the biding
process since bids used in one auction process are no longer valid due to the
result of another parallel auction.
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2.2.5.3.1 M+ Approach - M+ (Botelho and Alami, 1999) could be, the first distributed
market-based system defined within a general architecture for the cooperation among
multiple robots. In this system, when a robot calculates the cost of a task, it considers
one task ahead for each robot that allowed, whenever possible, an overlapping between
the execution of the current task for a robot and the planning and task allocation of the
next one, which increases the efficiency of the solution. In order to synchronize subtask
execution, the M+ approach imposes soft time constraints on subtasks for a complex task.
Costs are also associated with the quality of time-constraint satisfaction. In a multi-robot
context, robots negotiate with one another to adapt its plan incrementally. Since each
task has a different execution time, for future negotiations, agents optimize deviation for
different execution times. Along the way, tasks can be moved from one UAV (agent) to
another through negotiation.
2.2.5.3.2 MURDOCH Approach - MURDOCH is a general task allocation system based
on principled, resource centric, published/subscribe communication model that makes
extensive use of explicit inter-robot communication (Gerkey and Mataric, 2002).
Therefore, Murdoch is a MRST task allocation algorithm, in which robots do not take
part in auctions while they are executing a task. Therefore, a new task announced
dynamically will be allocated to idle robots. If all robots are executing a task; the task is
either discarded or re-announced after a period. Therefore, Murdoch appears as a version
of Contract Net Protocol (CNP) of Smith (1980), which uses simple auctions to allocate
tasks. Murdoch‘s approach is considered the first proven application of auction methods
for the coordination of physical multi-robot systems that applied multiple tasks.
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2.2.5.3.3 TraderBots Approach - TraderBots is price-based approach in which robots are
considered as self- interested agents and the team of robots as an economy. Its goal is to
complete tasks successfully while minimizing overall costs. The individual goal for each
robot is to maximize its individual profit, which at the end will contribute to overall good.
Robots have the ability to make plans and perform task assignment. Re-assignment is
allowable and dependencies are taken into account.
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CHAPTER 3
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Proble m Formulation
In this research environment, multiple buyers and sellers exchange a single item
at a time; the TI creates n sensor-visit tasks corresponding to n random UGSs and assigns
them to GSs via auctioning. The GSs (and later on the UAVs) calculate the incremental
cost for specific tasks and submit their sell (respectively, buy) bids to the TI
(respectively, GS). The market system consists of multiple buyers and sellers that submit
their bids for standardized units of well-defined items by stating the amount and the price
they will trade, referred to as a ―double auction.‖ Each bidder expresses its subjective
preference for the traded item using a utility function, which represents its estimate of its
real cost to perform such a task.
Consider a set of n UGSs scattered in a remote area. A team of m UAVs
designated to frequently visit these sensors collect their data and deliver it to the ground
stations (GSs). Therefore, the objective of the coordination problem is to apply double
auctions to reduce the overall cost while satisfying time constraints. The TI is located at
the origin of a 3D-space bounded by the following ranges:
-2CommUAVMax ≤ x ≤ 2CommUAVMax
-2CommUAVMax ≤ y ≤ 2CommUAVMax, and
0 ≤ z ≤ 2CommUAVMax ,
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where, Co mmUAVMax is the maximum communication radius admissible by a UAV. The TI
computes the cost and the deadline for each task as indicated by Equations (3.1) and
(3.2).
TIT askCost (t) = P0 (1+up *t/tH)

(3.1)

TItH(TK) = 2*||Tk – TI||2 / UAV _Speed + t

(3.2)

i

where, t is the time elapsed between the times the task is created until the time the task is reauctioned, up is a parameter to determine the increment in the price, tH is the deadline time for
the task (TK) to be received by the auctioneer, and UAV _Speed is the speed of the UAV ,
i

i

as also used in Equation (3.3).
P0= 2*(|| Tk – TI||2 *(udc + utcost / UAV _Speed) )

(3.3)

i

Ideally, as soon as a task is created it is auctioned immediately to the GSs. The TI
broadcasts its tasks one at a time. Each GS broadcasts the announced task to the UAVs in its
connectivity range and submits its sell bid paired with the minimum buy bid received from
the UAVs to the TI. The TI ranks all received bids in descending order from maximum to
minimum to generate a supply and demand profile. Then, the TI evaluates its received bids
and assigns the task to the GS with the minimum sell bid, which is paired with a UAV‘s
minimum buy bid. The GS that was paired with the winner UAV ( UAV ) prior to ranking the
iWin

bids (denoted by GS ) will tell UAV to execute the task. The GS will receive profit equal
iWin

jUAV

jUAV

to the difference between its bid price and the announced winner GSs (denoted by GS ) bid
jWin

price. The winner UAV ( UAV ), and the winner GS ( GS ) will receive the profit calculated
iWin

jWin
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using Equation (3.4).
Profit GSi = Profit UAV = 0.5*(( GS _SBid jWin

UAV
iWin

_BBid)+ (TI_P 0-

GS _SBid)- ( GS
jWin

jUAV

_SBid -

GS _SBid))

(3.4)

jWin

If at any time a UAV does not deliver the task to the original GS, a penalty is incurred
that reduces its profit as in Equation (3.5).
Penalty = 0.5*( GS _SBid - GS _SBid)
jUAV

(3.5)

jWin

Further, the UAVs submit bids reflecting the incremental cost of the data-delivery task,
and the GS allocates the task to the UAV submitting the minimum bid. This procedure is
repeated until all tasks are sold. However, allocation of data delivery tasks to UAVs
must continue to optimize the overall distance traveled and to satisfy the deadline time
constraint on data delivery time as denoted by Equation (3.6).

Ti j1

Ti j

tH

i

N, 1

j

n

(3.6)

Let Tji be the ith data delivery time for the jth sensor, tH be the deadline time for data
deliveries for any sensor, and n be the number of unattended ground sensors. In this case,
we are dealing with a continuous task allocation mechanism that satisfies the constraint
on data delivery time while optimizing the team‘s average distance traveled per data
delivery.
To obtain a solution, we describe sensor- visit tasks. Each sensor- visit task
consists of visiting a sensor, collecting its data, and returning to the GS to deliver the
collected data. A task created or renewed is the task creation time. The data delivery
time for a task is also the time passed from the task's creation time to the time the TI
receives the task's data. By using the task creations and data delivery times, the problem
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statement reformulated as a problem of continuously allocating sensor-visit tasks to the
UAVs so the data delivery times of all sensor-visit tasks remain lower than tH.

3.2 Methodology
In this dynamic research environment, off- line methods are not appropriate
because new UGSs maybe added to or removed from the mission. Further, the team of
UAVs is prone to changes since we may lose some UAVs due to communication failure
or death, and a UAV maybe added to the mission at any time. Additionally, continuously
updating task allocations will produce more allocations that are efficient because
allocations depend on the UAVs‘ positions when tasks are refreshed, and efficient
allocations may change from round to round. Therefore, in this auction, the following
assumptions are considered:
1. Tasks are created every two seconds.
2. Since the auction happen so quickly, UAVs wait until all tasks are auctioned before
they start moving towards their tasks; otherwise, they hover around the GSs they
communicate with.
3. The space is constrained to
-2CommUAVMax ≤ x ≤ 2CommUAVMax,
-

2CommUAVMax ≤ y ≤ 2 CommUAVMax, and

0 ≤ z ≤ 2CommUAVMax .
4. Three GSs are scattered around the TI and communicate with one another.
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5. A UAV‘s tasks are not delivered unless that UAV communicates with the GS it is
supposed to deliver the tasks to.
A market-based approach uses communication efficiently since the UAVs
compress information into bids. The role of the TI is limited to task creation and to
holding auctions as well as matching sell bids with buy bids. In a double auction, each
bidder has a private utility value for an item, which represents its real cost to perform
such a task. In dealing with a minimization problem, we are trying to find a way to
reduce the overall cost. Therefore, in this auction, the TI broadcasts its tasks one at a
time, each GS broadcasts the announced task to UAVs in its connectivity range and
submits its sell bid, paired with the minimum buy bid received from the UAVs, to the TI.
GSs use the TI‘s reservation price to generate their own price for the auctioned task,
which is based on their linear distance to the auctioned task and the time needed for the
task to be executed by a prospective UAV, which is also based on its known speed.
The UAV inserts its awarded task into its current plan where the task remains
until the UAV delivers the corresponding data to the GS. When a GS receives the task's
data, the TI‘s information will be updated accordingly. Transaction determinations and
winners (buyers and sellers) who are going to transact in the double auction are
completely based on the bid price subject to the following constraints:
The bid price must be less than or equal to the announced reservation price,
A UAV that has a task from a previous auction cycle may submit a new buy bid if
and only if executing the current bid will not make any previous won tasks in his
task list time out.
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The GS places a bid equal to the GS Cost for this task if and only if the constraint prescribed
j

by Equation (3.7) is met.

GS Cost (Tk ) ≤ TIT askCost (Tk )

(3.7)

j

Each GS auctions the task to all UAVs in its communication range. In other words, if the
constraint prescribed by Equation (3.8) is met, a UAV qualifies to place a bid for that task
from that GS.
||UAV – GS||2 ≤ CSUAV-GS*(CommUAV + CommGS)

(3.8)

where CSUAV-GS, in [0, 1], is the communication strength between the UAV and GS,
CommUAV is the communication radius of the UAV, and CommGS is the communication
radius of the GS.

3.3 Market-based Coordination Frame work
UAVs, GSs and the TI trade tasks continuously via double auctions. The TI
creates some tasks for bidding by the GSs. At this point, each GS starts broadcasting an
availability message containing its ID to determine available agents within its
communication range. When a GS detects a UAV inside its communication range, it sets
an available flag for that UAV and adds it to its auction list. A GS offers its tasks only to
members within its communication range. When a GS immediately detects an available
agent within its communication range, auctioning of its task starts. Each UAV sends a
bid representing its most profitable deal to the source GS. A GS, as auctioneer, evaluates
all received bids, and sends its cost accompanied by the minimum buy bid to the TI.
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3.4 Policy of the Market
Based on the description of our market given in Section (3.3), the market policy
is introduced as follows:
The accepting policy states that, in order for an incoming bid to be accepted, it
must be less than or equal to the reservation price announced by the auctioneer.
The purpose of such policy is to maintain a successful rate of transactions, and to
signal to traders the current market prices.
The matching policy defines how to match a buy bid with a sell bid. For any
auctioned task, the minimum sell bid will be matched with the minimum buy bid.
The clearing policy determines what matched bids are being executed.
The clearing price will be equal to the won bid (Mth ) price.
For any GS that auctions a specific task that it has paired with a UAV offering a
minimum bid, the bids from all the GS-UAV pairs are ranked in ascending order of
magnitude. Suppose the number of GSs submitting bids is M. Counting from the top
ranked bids, the value in the Mth position is the clearing price that task is sold for, and the
that GS and the UAV making the bid becomes the seller and the buyer (winner),
respectively, for that task. Then the UAV delivers the task to that GS. A task not sold
during the auction round is re-auctioned at a higher cost as determined by Equation (3.1).
This procedure is repeated until all tasks are sold.
Generally, the TI can determine ‗what‘ and ‗how‘ an incoming bid is transacted.
Briefly, we can say, for a given set of incoming orders, that the accepting policy
determines what bids are to be accepted. The matching policy determines whose bid can
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be matched with whom, and the clearing policy specifies the transaction that should be
executed.
Transaction determinations and winners (buyers and sellers) that are going to
transact in double auctions have two issues that need to be well defined. For instance,
given the buy and sell bids for the following example, which of these is going to transact
and at what clearing price? Which will lead us to the M th and the (M+1)st price?
3.4.1 Mth and (M+1)st Price Rules
Let X denotes the set of all buy and sells bids for a single task; M of these bids are
the sell offers, and N represents the buy offers. The Mth price rule sets the clearing price
at the Mth lowest price among all X bids. The (M+1)st price rule sets the clearing price at
the (M+1) st lowest price among all X bids. In order to determine the bids that are going
to be transacted, the transaction set proceeds as follows:
While the lowest remaining buy bid is less than or equal to the lowest sell bid,
remove these bids from the set of outstanding bids and add them to the set of
matched bids (transaction set).
Note that the Mth price is undefined if there are no sellers, and the (M+1)st price is
undefined if there are no buyers.
Consider the set of bids in the double auction shown in Figure 3.1. The number
of total bids is X = 6, of which M (number of sell offers) = 3 and N (number of buy
offers) is X – M = 3. The Mth clearing price is the Mth bid among all submitted bids while
the (M+1) st price is the (M+1)st bid among all bids X = {30, 27, 25, 24, 18, 15}.
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Figure 3.1. Sche matic of bids in double auction with M th and (M+1) st price

To determine the transaction set, the lowest buy bid is matched with the lowest
sell bid, providing the constraints in Section 3.2 are met. This process continues until the
buy bid is higher than the sell bid. The transaction set will be {(15, 24), (18, 25)}.
Matched bids are removed from the outstanding bids and placed in the matched bids
profile where the lowest sell bid and the lowest buy bid are transacted. For instance, the
sell bid 25 cannot be transacted since only one task will be sold, which is the lowest buy
and sell bids. The transaction price can either be set at 25 (the Mth ) or at 24 (the (M+1)st )
price.
For instance, take the first set of bids in the transaction set (24, 15). If the Mth
price is used, then each buyer and seller will make a profit equal to ½*((24-15) + (3024)), which is $7.5, assuming the TI‘s reservation price (P0 ) is $30, using Equation (3.4).
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3.4.2 Auction Structure
This implementation consists of two different kinds of auctions:
1. Auctions held by the TI, and
2. Auctions held by the GSs
3.4.2.1 Combined Auction Procedures
The auction proceeds as follows; see also the flow diagram in Figure 3.2:
1. Task Announcement: Each auction starts with an offer message sent by the
auctioneer (TI) to all GSs (TI  GSs). The message contains the task‘s id, sensor
location, task‘s creation times, task‘s deadline, and task‘s prices.
2. GS Call for Bid: Upon receipt of the offer message from the TI, each GS
broadcasts the task and calculates its cost for that task.
3. GS’s Buyers Bid Evaluation: Each GS evaluates the buy bids received from the
UAVs for validity according to the accepting policy and chooses a bid with the
minimum price.
4. Bid Submission: Each GS submits its bid with the winner UAV‘s buy bid to the
TI.
5. Matching Result: The auctioneer (TI) evaluates all received bids and finds the
one with the most profit. Then it matches a GS with the minimum sell bid with
the ID of the minimum buy bid and the clearing price.
6. Win Confirmation: Each winner (GS or UAV) receives the result and sends a
confirmation message to the auctioneer indicating notification about the result.
7. Offer End: The auctioneer sends an Offer End message to the auction participants
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when it successfully receives the Win Confirmation message and closes the
auction.

Task Announcement

Buyers & Sellers
Submit Bids

Bid ≤ Task
Price?
Yes

Select Min. of
Sale Bids

No

Select Min. of
Buy Bids

Min Buy Bid ≤
Sell Bid?

Match Seller
& Buyer

No

Yes

Reject Bid

Figure 3.2. Flow diagram for the market policy

3.4.3 Cost Estimation
As previously mentioned, tasks are traded between the TI, GSs and UAVs. In
order to define the allocation problem for such environments, it is necessary to specify
the cost functions, as given by Equation (3.9).

38

P(Tl, GSk ) = R(Tl , GSk ) − C(Tl , GSk )

(3.9)

where P is the profit generated by the ground station GS k by accepting the task Tl and R
and C are revenue and cost functions, respectively. The revenue function indicates the
benefit of executing a task, and the cost function provides an estimate of the cost to
accomplish the same task. In this dissertation, rewards associated with tasks are not
considered; therefore, the utility functions equal the cost of the tasks. Further, tasks are
waypoints, and costs define an amount that reflects the distance between each GS or
UAV and the location of interest, such as the traveled Euclidean distance.
The global objective of the task allocation algorithm is to minimize overall costs.
An important term used in the following chapters is global cost, which is the sum of the
allocated task costs. Therefore, the global objective used for this dissertation is the
minimization of the global cost. The multi- ground station task allocation problem stated
in terms of global costs is as follows:
Given a set of tasks, T = {T1 , T2 , ..., Tt }, a set of GSs {GS1 , GS2 , ..., GSr}, and a
function P(Ti, GSi) that specifies the cost of executing a subset Ti of the set of tasks T
by GSi, find the allocation of tasks to GSs that minimizes the global cost as given by
Equation (3.10).
r
i 1

i

P(T , GS )

(3.10)

i

where r is the number of GSs and the subset of tasks Tj is assigned to GSj.
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The TI issues and renews tasks, and each GS submits bids for the newly issued tasks; a
task is assigned to the GS with the minimum bid. The TI‘s algorithm for this allocation is
as follows:
if a task is created then
announce task
while timer is running do
receive bids
end while
calculate best bid
match buyer with seller
award task to best match
remove task from announcement list
end if
For each auction cycle, there is only one awarded task. Upon winning a task, the
winning GS broadcasts the same task(s) to the UAVs within its connectivity range. The
UAVs then calculate the cost for adding the new task to their current pla n. Then, the
difference between the two plans (current plan and old plan) is the cost for UAV to
i

execute the auctioned task.
The algorithm for the GS task allocation is as follows:
if a task-list is not empty then
announce task
while timer is running do
calculate cost
receive bids
end while
calculate best bid
send cost and best bidder
remove task from task-list
end if
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When a GS assigns a task to the winning UAV, it keeps the winner‘s id, task id, winner‘s
cost, and the task due time in different lists to maintain control of its awarded task(s).
In this problem, two types of costs contribute to the marginal cost of adding a new
task to a plan:
1. The distance cost is the cost due to the additional distance that the UAV should
travel, and
2. The time cost is the cost due to latency that performing this task will cause in the
data delivery time of the other tasks already in the plan.
3.4.4 GSs Cost Estimation
In the set up simulated in this work, there are three GSs located 120˚ apart from
each other around the TI. The GSs communicate with the TI all the time. When a task is
created at the TI level, each GS submits a bid for that task. The bid is based on the linear
distance to that task and uses the task‘s information provided by the TI (i.e., id, price,
location, and creation time), which has a different price for each task. First, the TI
computes the cost and the deadline time for that task according to Equations (3.11) and
(3.12):
TIT askCost (t) = P0 (1+up *t/tH)

(3.11)

where tH is the deadline time for task TK to be received by the auctioneer, as given by
Equation (3.12).
tH(TK) = 2*||Tk – TI||2 / UAV _Speed + t
i
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(3.12)

where t is the time elapsed from the time the task is created until the time the task is reauctioned, up is a parameter to determine increments in the price, tH is the deadline time
for the task TK to be received by the auctioneer, udc is the distance unit cost, and
UAV _Speed is the speed of U AV , as used in Equation (3.13).
i

i

P0 (Tk ) = 2*|| Tk – TI||2 *(udc + utcost /UAV _Speed))

(3.13)

i

By the time the task reaches its deadline, if up is chosen to equal 1, the price of the
task will have doubled since its creation time. This will motivate the GSs to bid for the
task that was not profitable during previous auction cycles. When a task Tk is created at
the TI level, all GSs will use the same TI‘s price function to generate a new bid for the
auctioned task. The GS will place a bid equal to GST askCost for this task if and only if the
constraint prescribed by Equation (3.14) is met.
GST askCost ≤ TIT askCost (t)

(3.14)

Therefore, the GS‘s bid will be the GS‘s linear distance to Tk and back; in addition to the
time the UAV needs to execute the task.
First, the GSs calculate their cost as given by Equation (3.15).
1 ≤ j ≤ 3,

GS distCost = 2*(||dist( GS , Tk )||2 *udc
j

j

(3.15)

where Tk is a new auctioned task to be added to GS current plan, and udc is the unit
j

distance cost. Second, since the speed of the UAVs is known to the GSs, any GS can
j

predict the execution time for the newly auctioned task. Therefore, the time cost to
execute a new auctioned task is calculated using Equation (3.16).
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GS timeCost = 2*( GS dist / SpeedUAV)*utcost,
j

(3.16)

j

where utcost is the time unit cost, which is known to all GSs, and GS timeCost is the cost of
j

the time for GS to receive the task‘s data, which is based on the task‘s distance to GS ,
j

j

GSdist , and the UAV‘s speed, SpeedUAV. The sum of Equations (3.15) and (3.16) yields
the GS‘s estimated cost, as given by Equation (3.17).

GS Cost = GS distCost + GS timeCost
j

j

(3.17)

j

And the GSs bids were calculated using Equation (3.18).

GS Bid = GS Cost
j

(3.18)

j

Since a GS bids according to its true valuation for a task, a bid in Equation (3.18)
will be the actual cost of the auctioned task to the GS that will submit it to the TI. P 0 is a
new term that the GS will use to determine the price of task(s) later. Therefore, the GS
will use the P0 from the TI, as given by Equation (3.3), in order to generate its cost for
newly auctioned tasks.
As previously mentioned, the auctioneer uses a time- increasing function P(t) for
assigning prices to tasks. In order for any seller to maximize all profit made, the seller
must sell tasks won as soon as possible. Further, a GS is not assured of selling a task
within a fixed time because bidders will only bid when assured a profit. This is the main
reason for using the increasing varying price function, which encourages buyers to bid for
unsold tasks in the near future. Therefore, the GS will make the task price function an
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increasing function of time, which will guarantee that UAVs will be encouraged to buy
tasks that were not profitable to them during previous auction cycles. The price function
is given by Equation (3.19).
GS_P(t) = P0 *(1+up *t/tH)

(3.19)

The price function also motivates bidders to bid on those tasks for which more
time has passed since their creation and so have become more profitable. Clearly, the
most profitable task is not necessarily the task with the lowest cost. Ajorlou et al. (2007)
suggested that, since price is time varying and profit is price minus cost, this time varying
function will have an important effect on the balance between a task‘s cost and the
importance of a task in the task allocation process. Assume that the price of task Tk,
offered by the TI at time t is P(t - t T), where, t T is the creation time of Tk. The difference
in price, with regard to time, should be large enough to overcome the extra cost that an
expensive important task may have compared to other offered tasks, which can improve
the performance by decreasing the probability of successive timeouts for a given task.
Clearly, the auctioneer associates a price with each offered task, and upon
appropriate completion of the task, it pays revenue equal to the task's price to the agent
that performed the task. Agents' bids reflect the profit they can make by accepting and
performing tasks. In this case, the GSs and UAVs share the profit evenly after task
completion. Equation 3.4 is presented again here as Equation (3.20) for clarity.
Profit GS = ProfitUAV = 0.5*(( GS _SBid jWin

UAV
iWin

_BBid)+ (TI_P 0-
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GS _SBid)- ( GS
jWin

jUAV

_SBid -

GS _SBid)) (3.20)
jWin

Adding any task to the bidder‘s current plan will result in an additional distance
an executing agent needs to travel, and the delivery time of tasks will be pushed back, as
expressed by Equation (3.21).

P0

t

t

H
(3.21)

R(t )
0

otherwise

where t is the elapsed time since the task creation and P0 is the price of the task. Note
that P0 may be different for different tasks and is equal to the price the auctioneer
announced while selling that task. If a GS offers a task, its price is determined by the
time- varying price function, as in Equation (3.11). As previously mentioned, for any
auctioned task, constraints must be satisfied in order for the task bid to be accepted.
The auctioneer, TI, knows the price function and uses it to calculate the price
announced to the GS when offering the task. However, the revenue that a UAV will
receive upon performing a task depends on both the time when it accepts the task and the
time when it delivers the data. Clearly, any GS will receive its revenue for any task it
won and executed in a time not exceeding the task‘s deadline time.
3.4.5 UAVs Cost Estimation
The initial locations of the UAVs are generated randomly such that each UAV
communicates with at least two GSs. In this dissertation, a given UAV can participate in
i

an auction with a given GS if and only if UAV is within GS ‘s range and GS is
j

i
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j

j

within UAV ‘s range. Whichever range is smaller will determine how close UAV must
i

i

be to GS for them to participate together. We make the simplifying assumptions that all
j

UAVs and GSs have the same range. Call the area around a GS within which it can carry
j

on an auction with a UAV its domain; a UAV‘s domain is defined similarly but with
respect to a GS. Whether the UAV‘s range is smaller than the GS‘s range o r vice versa,
the domains of all GSs will be the same size and shape.
An interesting case is where the GSs‘ domains overlap. When the TI announces
its task(s), each GS checks for availability of UAVs before announcing a task. When a
GS receives a response from any UAV in its connectivity range, the GS starts to
broadcast the announced task. The UAV should deliver the data to the GS for which it
sold the corresponding data-delivery task because that GS will count on that UAV
returning it within a certain time. As previously stated, if it delivers the data to another
GS, it incurs a large penalty. Recall that Equation (3.5) is
Penalty = 0.5*( GS _SBid - GS _SBid)
jUAV

jWin

Upon receipt of a task announcement, the UAV computes its first bid and the
estimated time taken to deliver the task to the GS according to Equations (3.22) and
(3.23).
UAVT askCost = DistUAV- Tk *udcost + DistUAV- Tk *utcost /*UAV _Speed

(3.22)

UAV tH = DistUAV- Tk / UAV _Speed

(3.23)

i

i

i
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Then, the UAV places a bid for an amount equal to its cost to that GS for the task if the
constraints prescribed by Equations (3.24) and (3.25) are met.
≤ TIT askCost (t) and

(3.24)

UAV tH(TK) ≤ TItH(TK ) - tUAVstart

(3.25)

UAV
i

TaskCost (Tk )

i

where tUAVstart is the time the UAV starts executing the task in its task list.
If the UAV already has at least one task in its task list, then calculating the marginal
cost is NP hard and requires re-planning for a new set of tasks. For simplicity, we use a
heuristic in which we inserted the new task in all possible positions in the current plan and
chose the one that minimized the distance cost of the new plan. In addition to Equation
(3.26), the constraints denoted by Equations (3.27) and (3.28) have to be met.
TItHnew ≤ TItHold

(3.26)

tUAVstart + tPathNew ≤ TItHnew

(3.27)

UAVT askCostExtra ≤ TITaskCost (TK)

(3.28)

where
UAVT askCostExtra = UAVCostCurrentPath - UAVCostPreviousPath .
TItHold and TItHnew are the task deadlines for the immediate previous and the new task to bid
for, respectively; UAVT askCostExtra is the extra cost for adding on an additional task. If all
these constraints are met, then the UAV places a bid for the new task according to Equation
(3.29).
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UAVT askCost (TK) = UAVT askCostExtra

(3.29)

3.5 Robustness
3.5.1 UAV Malfunction
In this dynamic research environment of market-based mechanisms, recall that, in
order for a UAV to submit a bid, the UAV must first is able to deliver the task on time,
meaning that the UAV's contract is time- limited, and the UAV is responsible for
delivering its won task in a timely fashion. During task execution, in the event a UAV
malfunction, the tasks may not be delivered as desired. All undelivered tasks are reauctioned to existing UAVs when the UAV never recovers to complete the task in its task
list. To plan for any uncertainties, undelivered tasks from a disconnected UAV are not
immediately re-auctioned. First, the GS allocates an extended time. Then, after this time
has elapsed, undelivered tasks are re-auctioned. This extended time is computed using
Equation (3.30).
tReauction = (1+γ) * min(TItH- UAV ) 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
i

where TItH- UAV contains task deadlines for all the tasks that are in the task list

(3.30)

for a

i

specific UAV .
i

Since the route information for each UAV is known, the location of the UAV can
easily be found. Since the re-auction happens very frequently (every 2 secs), all UAVs
hover around their current locations until announced re-auctioned tasks are sold. A GS

48

will assume a UAV malfunction if a certain amount of time has passed since task(s)
deadline has elapsed and the GS did not yet receive their corresponding data. γ is a
constant number chosen between zero and one, which is multiplied by the deadline to
allow latency in delivering data due to possible estimation errors. The task deadline
triggers a UAV malfunction detection and recovery. When a GS experiences a situation
where needed task data was not received for a period of at least equal to the threshold
time, it auctions all tasks won by the malfunctioned UAV. Additionally, the fact that the
price is an increasing function of time accelerates the recovery process by providing more
profit for timed out tasks compared to the corresponding profit of its regular price.
When the re-auction begins, all the remaining tasks (undelivered tasks) from each
UAV become the previous task list. Consequently, the route starting from the current
location of that UAV becomes the immediate previous route. As a result, the procedures
described for GS and UAV bidding for a new task still apply except the new task
deadline for any re-auctioned task is determined by Equation (3.31).
TItHnewj = TItHoldj + tjReauction – max(tMalfunctioned, tUAVstart )

(3.31)

where
TItHnewj is the new task deadline for a given task j,
TItHoldj is the old task deadline for a given task j,
tMalfunctioned is the time at which the UAV get malfunctioned, and
tjReauction ≥ tReauction is the time at which task j is re-auctioned.
3.5.2 Communication Failure
A UAV might also fail to communicate during the auction process. Frequent
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auctioning allows the UAV to regain its ground and is an essential part of this
coordination method designed to accelerate the recovery of such a problem. As soon as a
UAV recovers from the communication failure by being able to communicate with any
GS, the UAV will start observing the auction rules and participate in new auctions.
Dias et al. (2003) suggested the following strategies to improve robustness:
monitoring the communication connectivity to robots that have subcontracted
tasks,
frequent auctioning and bidding, which help reallocate tasks among robots more
efficiently,
the absence of assumptions that all agents will participate in any auction, and
continuous scheduling of assigned tasks for execution as tasks are completed.
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CHAPTER 4
MULTI-GROUND STATIONS TASK ALLOCATION WITH
DOUBLE AUCTION

This chapter studies the performance of market-based coordination methods to
demonstrate how a double auction can influence the quality of the solution. Double
auction consists of multiple buyers and sellers participating to trade a commodity. Each
buyer and seller submits a bid representing its offer to buy or sell the auctioned
commodity. Submitted bids are matched, and the auction is cleared thereafter. A double
auction, then, is a two-sided auction. One side represents a centralized approach while
the other represents a distributed approach. This enables the market to compute the
information in an efficient manner while providing quicker responses.
This study investigated the effect of increasing the UAVs‘ communication ranges
on the distance travelled, and the time of task delivery using a different number of tasks
while the UAVs participated in double auction coordination. Therefore, the global
objective used in this dissertation is the minimization of the global cost (distance
travelled).

4.1 Market Setup
The market setup consists of an allocation of a set T of tasks among a set of GSs
partitioning T among the GSs, where T = {T1 , T2 , . . . , Tn } and GSs = { GS1 , GS2 , . . . ,
GSm}. This is denoted by a tuple [T1 , T2 , ... , Tn-1 , Tn ] where:
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Each subset of tuples represents tasks assigned to a GS, i.e., a ground station GS i
is assigned the tasks represented by Ti = {Ta, Tb, . . . , Tt}, which is a subset of
the set T.
The union of the sets of tasks in the tuple is equal to the complete set of tasks, i.e.,
Tl

Tk

...

Tn = T

The sets in the tuple are pairwise disjoint, i.e., Tl

Tk = Ø; for all i

k.

The purpose of using a task allocation algorithm is to minimize overall costs, which are
defined as the sum of the allocated task costs. Hence, a task allocation problem for
multiple GSs can be stated as follows:
Given a set of tasks, T = [T1 , T2 , . . . , Tn ], a set of GSs = [GS1 , GS2 , . . . , GSm ], and a
function P(Ti , GSk ) that specifies the utility of executing a subset of tasks Ti by GSi, i
= 1, 2, …, n, find the allocation of tasks to GS i that optimizes the overall objective.
Tasks are issued by the TI to the GSs for bidding, and allocated to the GSs with the
minimum bid. In defining the allocation problem, it is important to specify the cost
function given in Chapter 3, Equation 3.2, repeated here as Equation 4.1.
P(Ti, GSk ) = R(Ti , GSk ) − C(Ti , GSk ),

(4.1)

where P is the profit generated by the ground station GS k for accepting tasks Ti, and R
and C are the revenue and cost functions, respectively. The revenue function, R(Ti, GSk ),
represents the cost benefit to GS k for executing task Ti, and the cost function, C(Ti , GSk ),
represents a cost estimate for GS k for accomplishing the same task. Tasks are waypoints,
and costs are numbers that reflect the distance between each GS and a waypoint of
interest, such as the Euclidean travelled distance.
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4.2 Simulation Setup
This section describes the simulation environment that consists of one TI, three
GSs, and a different number of UAVs. The TI, GSs, and UAVs interact over tasks issued
by the TI. The TI is located at the origin of a 3D-space bounded by the following ranges:
-2CommUAVMax ≤ x ≤ 2CommUAVMax,
-2CommUAVMax ≤ y ≤ 2CommUAVMax , and
0 ≤ z ≤ 2 CommUAVMax ,
where CommUAVMax is the maximum communication radius admissible by a UAV during
the design of that UAV, and x, y, and z are the coordinate axis.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the three GSs are located 120˚ apart from each other
around the TI, and can communicate with the TI at all times. The initial locations of the
UAVs are generated randomly such that each UAV communicates with at least two GSs.
A given UAV can participate with a given GS if and only if UAV is within GS ‘s range
i

j

i

j

and GS is within UAV ‘s range. Whichever range is smallest determines how close
j

i

UAV must be to GS for them to participate together. The simplifying assumption is
i

j

that all UAVs and GSs have the same range. The area around GS in which it can carry
j

on an auction with a UAVi is its domain. Whether the UAV‘s range is smaller than the
GS‘s range or vice versa, the domains of all GSs are the same size and shape.
The TI‘s and GSs‘ communication ranges are 100 meters, and 200 meters,
respectively. Any GS has at least one UAV within its communication range before the
start of the initial auction. Any UAV can communicate with at least two GSs at the
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beginning of the auction. To enhance the design‘s quality of solution, the UAVs‘
communication ranges fell between 250 meters to 2,500 meters, and their speed is 10
m/s. The unit distance cost (udcost ) is set at $0.1 / m, the time unit cost (tucost ) at $0.1 /s,
and up , a parameter to determine an increase in price, is set at 1. Each task has a different
value, which is determined by its distance from the TI. This implies that, using the time
varying price function, the price for a task will double when it reaches its deadline, tH,
from its creation time and has not been sold.
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Figure 4.1. Setup of TI, three GSs and nine UAVs for double auction

Each GS submits bids for newly issued tasks. A task is assigned to a pair of GSs
and the UAV with the minimum bid. A task is an act of visiting and collecting data from
a specific sensor location by a UAV and delivering the collected data to the TI through a
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GS later. In a practical sense, a TI could be a control room or any agent (including
humans) with the ability to initiate and re-allocate tasks to the fittest pair of GSs and
UAVs through double auction. In this scenario, the UAVs have the ability to buy from
more than one GS and deliver tasks to a source GS.

4.3 Inte raction between TI and GSs
This section describes the interaction between the TI and GSs with emphasis on
optimizing task allocation in double auction. Presented are the results of five runs with
relative statistics and associated profits.
4.3.1 Double Auction between GSs and UAVs
All GSs compete as self- interested agents to maximize their profits, and the
UAVs aim to minimize their overall distance travelled in order to execute tasks. The
distance cost of adding a new task to any GS‘s current plan is double the linear distance
from the GS to the task location in addition to the time needed for task(s) execution.
Since the UAVs‘ speed is known, the GSs can predict the time cost for an auctioned task.
Based on this information, the GSs submit their bids to the TI (refer to Chapter 3).
Task performance is measured using the averages of at least five runs for each
communication range. Initially, Tables 4.1 through 4.5 summarizes the results for each
run for the GSs and UAVs, and the profits each made during the auction cycles. Table
4.1 presents the data for twelve random tasks for six UAVs at 250 meters and the
transactions between the UAVs and GSs for exchanging task(s) during each run.
Randomly generated tasks do not necessarily mean tasks will be bought by the same
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UAV from the previous run. Instead, the cost of any task might change during each run
depending on how far the task is from the UAV, and the time needed for execution.

Table 4.1. Run 1: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12
random tasksat 250 meters
Task
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
T8
T9
T10
T11
T12

TI Price
$1117
$310
$1271
$1136
$1502
$832
$842
$508
$630
$1318
$1235
$1702

Seller (GS)
Bid
$1084
$268
$1233
$1107
$1466
$799
$819
$460
$612
$1289
$1202
$1664

Seller(GS)
ID
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
2

Buyer
(UAV) ID
2
4
1
1
3
3
1
1
2
5
5
6

Buyer Buyer/Seller
(UAV) Bid
Profits
$1023
$47
$215
$48
$1172
$50
$368
$384
$1410
$46
$336
$248
$410
$216
$216
$146
$167
$231
$1215
$51
$277
$479
$1616
$43

Since delivery cost is assumed to be at the intersection of the UAVs‘
communication range and the target sensor location, tasks executed by each UAV might
also change from one run to the next, depending on whether the task(s) on the UAV‘s list
permits executing a newly auctioned task without making any of its previous won task(s)
timeout. The profit each UAV and GS generates during a double auction relies on how
well the UAVs are positioned during the auctioned task with respect to the task‘s location
and the UAV‘s communication ranges. The program ran for at least five times to
generate profit, as denoted by Equation 4.2.
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m

GS _ average _ profit
j

Average(

UAVi _ Pr ofit ) 1

j

3

(4.2)

i 1

where m is the number of UAVs that paired with GS during the auction and
j

GS _average_profit is the average profit made by that specific GS. The data in Tables
j

4.2 through 4.5 show the profit for each GS and a list of corresponding UAVs for runs 2
through 5.

Table 4.2. Run 2: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12
random tasks at 250 meters
Seller (GS) ID
1

GS Total Profit
$462

GS Task List
4, 5, 11, 12

Buyer (UAV) ID
1, 2, 4, 6

2

$255

3, 6

1, 2

3

$873

1, 2 ,7, 8, 9, 10

1, 4, 5, 6

Table 4.3. Run 3: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12
random tasks at 250 meters
Seller (GS) ID
1

GS Total Profit
$736

GS Task List
1, 7, 8, 9

Buyer (UAV) ID
1, 3, 4

2

$1578

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12

2, 4, 1, 5

3

$444

10

1

Table 4.4. Run 4: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12
random tasks at 250 meters
Seller (GS) ID
1

GS Total Profit
$1258

GS Task List
2, 3, 6, 9, 10

Buyer (UAV) ID
3, 4, 5

2

$935

7, 8, 11, 12

3, 4

3

$648

1, 4, 5

3, 5
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Table 4.5. Run 5: Profit generated by GSs and six UAVs while auctioning 12
random tasks at 250 meters
Seller (GS) ID
1

GS Total Profit

2

$606
$202

3

$809

GS Task List
3, 5, 6, 10, 12

Buyer (UAV) ID
2, 3, 4

1, 7

1, 4

2, 4, 8, 9, 11

1, 2, 5, 6

4.3.2 Results for increasing UAVs’ Communication Range
The impact of increasing the UAVs‘ communication ranges was investigated to
enhance the quality of the solution for each GS. Profits are divided evenly between
participating GSs and UAVs. Therefore, each GS‘s profit influenced the total distance
travelled by the UAVs on the GS‘s / UAV list and the total execution time for its task(s),
which affected the UAV‘s ability to reach and execute tasks at an earlier time. Further,
since all UAVs‘ speed is constant, the only factor that affected a task‘s reachability is
their communication ranges.
The average GSs profit generated from these runs is the profit made by all UAVs
on its UAV list. The profit for the GSs at each communication range during the five runs
was summed to give the average profit. As shown in Table 4.6, each GS‘s profit
continued to increase as the UAVs‘ communication ranges increased. Because the UAVs
share profits evenly with their GSs, they also benefitted from increasing their
communication range.
As depicted in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.2, increasing the UAVs‘ communication
range affected not only the profit each buyer and seller generated, but also the task‘s
execution time as well. The UAV‘s constant speed contributed to the decrease in the
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distance travelled to execute a task, which was a direct result of increasing the UAV‘s
communication range. Thus, the decrease of distance travelled automatically affected the
task execution time.

Table 4.6. Average GSs profit while auctioning five sets of 12 random tasks to six
UAVs
UAVs
Communication
Range (m)
GS1

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

2250

2500

$724

$749

$774

$801

$837

$961

$981

$1070

$1081

$1101

GS2

$699

$719

$739

$758

$917

$940

$962

$984

$1001

$1025

GS3

$736

$754

$771

$788

$791

$876

$898

$903

$939

$959

Figure 4.2. UAV1’s trace of path time of task execution at different
communication ranges
Figure 4.2 shows UAV1‘s path of tasks execution during different communication
ranges that depicts the impact of increasing the UAV‘s communication ranges over the
tasks‘ execution time, which reduced the UAV‘s ability to deliver its tasks earlier since it
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travelled less distance to its intended GS and target sensor. Figure 4.2 also shows a large
drop in UAV1‘s path execution time when its communication range increased from 1250
meters to 1500 meters. At 1250 meters, UAV1 won tasks 10 and 6; while at 1500 meters
UAV1 won tasks 11 and 4. Therefore, the reason for the drop in path execution time is
that they have different coordinates.
Tasks must also be delivered on time such that any UAV will not bid for any
auctioned task that will cause any of its current task(s) to timeout. Since tasks are
generated randomly, their IDs and number of tasks won by an individual UAV may
change from one run to the next; therefore, the time required to execute the task(s) may
change accordingly. Table 4.7 shows the tasks path execution times and their tasks for
UAV1 with varied communication ranges. The results show it took less time when the
UAV‘s communication range increased for the same task(s) to be delivered to the same
destination.

Table 4.7. UAV1’s tasks execution time during different communication ranges
UAV Communication
Range (m)
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,250
2,500

Tasks Path Execution Times
(sec)
2056
2033
2011
1930
1907
708
685
663
640
618
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Task List
11, 6, 10
11, 6, 10
11, 6, 10
6, 10
6, 10
11, 4
11, 4
11, 4
11, 4
11, 4

4.3.3 Results of Average Distance Travelled and Average Time to Perform Tasks
In a double auction, UAVs may submit their bids to more than one GS to increase
their chances of winning an auctioned task as self- interested agents. Different cases were
investigated to show the effect of increasing the buyers‘ communication ranges during a
double auction. A base case involves nine random tasks auctioned to three GSs to sell to
six UAVs bidding to execute these tasks. Table 4.8 shows the average total distance
travelled to execute the tasks and the average time required to perform the tasks.
The data in Table 4.8 shows that the average time needed to execute tasks
improved as the UAV‘s communication range increased. When the UAVs
communication ranges increased from 250 meters to 2500 meters, the average distance of
data delivery decreased by 16.8%. As shown in Table 4.9, this decrease resulted in all
the GSs receiving a profit increase. GS1, GS2, and GS3 realized an increase in their
average profit up to 39.8%, 57.9% and 20.9%, respectively.

Table 4.8. Data delivery statistics for nine random tasks by six UAVs
UAV Communication
Range(m)
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,250
2,500

Mean Data Delivery
Distance (m)
9871
9625
9445
9264
9085
8905
8725
8545
8371
8213
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Mean Tasks Execution Time
(sec)
987
962
944
927
909
890
872
855
837
821

Table 4.9. Average GSs profit from selling nine tasks to six UAVs
UAV
Communicati
on Range (m)
GS1

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

2250

2500

$431

$454

$474

$493

$513

$533

$553

$573

$590

$602

GS2

$458

$504

$532

$559

$586

$613

$640

$668

$696

$723

GS3

$535

$548

$560

$573

$585

$597

$610

$622

$634

$647

This research used two cases to investigate the scalability of the market-based
coordination. In Case-1, the number of tasks was increased from 9 to 12, and in Case-2,
decreased from nine to six, respectively, while the number of UAVs that carried out the
job remained unchanged at six. The task execution time decreased for each UAV
delivering to the same destination as its communication range increased. As shown in
Table 4.10, the average data delivery distance travelled by all six UAVs decreased.

Table 4.10. Data delivery statistics for 12 random tasks by six UAVs
UAV Communication
Range(m)
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,250
2,500

Mean Data Delivery
Distance (m)
12676
12489
12301
12104
11821
11119
10924
10572
10341
10131

Mean Tasks Time
Execution (sec)
1268
1249
1230
1210
1182
1119
1092
1057
1034
1013

Even though the market is scaled up, it still benefitted from double auction, and is
better off by 3% in the distance travelled when tasks are scaled up to twelve as compared
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to the base case; see Table 4.8. This improvement accompanied an improvement in the
quality of the solution since the decrease in the average time of task execution showed
the same result for the reduction in the distance travelled.
Computing the profit generated by each GS in the double auction provides a
better view of these results. As the number of auctioned tasks increased for the same
UAVs, the probability of increasing the profit for each participating UAV increased. By
scaling the number of auctioned tasks to twelve, GS1, GS2 and GS3 received an increase
in their profit by 52%, 46.6% and 30.2%, respectively.
In Case-2, the number of tasks was scaled down to six tasks to be bought by the
same six UAVs who participated in double auction in Case-1. The data in Tables 4.11
and 4.12 show the results from increasing the UAVs communication range.

Table 4.11. Data delivery statistics for six random tasks by six UAVs
UAV Communication
Range(m)
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,250
2,500

Mean Data Delivery
Distance (m)
8080
7937
7783
7640
7420
7258
6958
6793
6595
6430

Mean Tasks Execution Time
(sec)
808
794
778
764
742
726
696
679
659
643

To investigate the matter further, using the same tasks, the numbers of buyers
were increased from six to nine to buy twelve tasks tha t were sold in Case-1. As in Case-
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1, increasing the UAV‘s ranges affected the average data delivery time for an auctioned
task by allowing it to be performed in a shorter time as data delivery will be completed
earlier due to the increase in the UAVs‘ communication range. Table 4.13 and Figure 4.3
show the effect on average time of tasks execution when the UAVs‘ ranges increased.

Table 4.12. Average GSs profit from selling 6 tasks to 6 UAVs
UAV
Communication
Range (m)
GS1

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

2250

2500

$130

$148

$165

$182

$200

$217

$234

$251

$278

$292

GS2

$291

$303

$320

$353

$370

$387

$465

$482

$502

$521

GS3

$192

$209

$226

$244

$261

$280

$284

$304

$324

$343

Table 4.13. Execution time of 12 tasks by UAVs during different
communication ranges
UAV Communication
Range(m)
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,250
2,500

Average Time Travelled by 6
UAVs
1268
1249
1230
1210
1182
1119
1092
1057
1034
1013

Average Time
Travelled by 9 UAVs
836
824
811
798
785
740
725
700
685
670

Increasing the communication ranges also improved the quality of the solution by
reducing the execution time, thus increasing each participant‘s profit. Table 4.14 shows
that increasing a UAV‘s communication range led to a decrease in the time travelled and
a decrease in the average distance travelled. Accordingly, the decrease in the distance
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travelled or the time of execution yielded an increase in the profit generated by
participating UAVs, as shown in Table 4.15. This meant that the increase in profit would
be divided evenly between the GSs and their UAVs.

Figure 4.3. Execution time of same 12 tasks in double auction

Table 4.14. Data delivery statistics for 12 random tasks by nine UAVs
UAV Communication
Range(m)
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,250
2,500

Mean Data Delivery
Distance Cost
$8364
$8239
$8114
$7981
$7854
$7398
$7253
$6997
$6851
$6699
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Mean Task Execution
Time(sec)
836
824
811
798
785
740
725
700
685
670

Table 4.15. GSs average profit while auctioning five sets of 12 random tasks
to nine UAVs
UAV
Communication
Range(m)
GS1

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

2250

2500

$751

$774

$796

$822

$845

$968

$988

$1088

$1090

$1112

GS2

$832

$854

$877

$899

$921

$944

$966

$989

$1016

$1033

GS3

$722

$739

$756

$774

$792

$879

$901

$905

$948

$985

This reduction in tasks execution time meant that the distance travelled also
reduced as observed earlier since the UAV‘s speed is constant. In fact, the decrease in
the average execution time is a direct result of the decrease in the average distance
travelled as depicted in Figure 4.4, where six UAVs compete to buy a different number of
auctioned tasks.

Figure 4.4. Average distance travelled by six UAVs competing over a different
number of tasks
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Since the average task execution time decreased as a result of increasing the
UAVs‘ communication ranges, the profit generated by the UAVs increased as well. The
increase in the UAVs‘ profit led to an increase in the average profit generated by GSs as
their profit is the summation of all profit made by each participant UAV that bought
task(s) from that specific GS, as mentioned before in Equation 4.2. As an example, refer
to Figure 4.5 and Table 4.15.

Figure 4.5. GSs average profit of selling 12 tasks to nine UAVs

Scaling up the number of UAVs from six to nine competing over the same
number of tasks resulted in the same improvement as the reduction in the average of task
execution time and the distance travelled (Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively) as well as the
profit generated due to increasing the UAVs‘ communication ranges (Figure 4.5).
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Scaling up the number of tasks to twelve resulted in a decrease of 31.8% in the
average task execution times, while the UAVs ranges increased from 250 meters to 2500
meters; see Table 4.13.
Increasing the number of UAVs competing for the same number of tasks resulted
in finding the fittest UAV, and a quicker response, which decreased the average distance
travelled as well as the average task execution times, as depicted by Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6. UAVs average distance travelled to execute 12 tasks

4.3.4 System Robustness
In a dynamic research environment, system robustness is one of the most
important criteria for reliability. The availability of task data to the TI is very crucial,
particularly in military operations or rescue missions; therefore, the system must be
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robust. To validate the system‘s robustness, UAV1, which had four tasks in its current
plan, {9, 10, 11, and 12} assumed to fail before delivering any of its tasks to GS2, as
shown in Figure 4.7.

10
3000
2500

9

11

z

2000
1500
1000
500
12
0
6000

UAV1
GS2

4000

0

0
y

4000
2000

2000
-2000
-2000

-4000

x

Figure 4.7. Path for executing tasks by UAV1

As a result, GS2 detected the absence of UAV1‘s task data after

time passed

because the deadline due time, tH, for the first task was due by UAV1. To recover from
this failure, using the time-increasing function with higher prices to accelerate recovering
these tasks, GS2 re-auctioned the undelivered tasks to the UAVs within its
communication range. The eligible UAVs submitted their bids for those tasks from
where they were at the beginning of re-auctioning, as shown in Table 4.16. During reauctioning, UAV2 won tasks 9 and 12 in addition to those delivered earlier, and on time.
For clarity, the execution path of tasks won by UAV2 before and after re-auctioning is
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shown in Figure 4.8. While UAV4 won task10 and delivered it to GS1 and the fourth reauctioned task was delivered by UAV1, it recovered from its failure and was able to win
this task during re-auctioning because at that time the task was already on its task list.

Table 4.16. UAVs coordinates at re-auctioning tasks
UAVi
1
2
3
4
5
6

x
313
-115
-115
219
-115
-115

y
-61
200
200
13
-180
-200

z
315
0
0
139
134
0

This robustness affected the time of data delivery due to the extended time due to
tasks not delivered on time. Therefore, the average time for tasks delivered increased
from 1005 seconds to 1095 seconds. The difference in these two numbers represents the
cost for making the system robust to uncertainty, and is the cost for assuring data
delivery.
Since re-auctioning in this case takes place only when tasks are not delivered at
their expected due time, re-auctioning undelivered tasks will cause some delay on the
average data delivery time. As shown in Figure 4.9, when 12 tasks was delivered by six
UAVs, at a range of 250 meters, re-auctioning caused a 295 seconds delay in data
delivery; while at a range of 2500 meters, re-auctioning caused the same data to be
delivered 127 seconds late.
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Figure 4.8. Path for executing tasks by UAV2 before and after validating
robustness

Figure 4.9. Data delivery time history for 12 tasks by six UAVs before and afte r reauctioning
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This dissertation studied the problem of collecting data from a series of unmanned
ground sensors (UGSs) using a team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and delivering
the information to a task initiator (TI) through the ground stations (GSs). The problem
formulated into a procurement auction between the TI and GSs and a do uble auction
between the GSs and UAVs, which was formalized as a continuous time-constraint
version of a multi-traveling salesperson problem.
A market-based coordination method was simulated using double auction
methods applying concepts of price, revenue, and cost to trade task allocations between
the UAVs and GSs. A double auction enabled the TI to benefit from 1) having different
ground stations reach farther locations in a timely manner, and 2) cost efficiency by
allowing task executions through a different agent in the system, which led to a decrease
in time and cost.
The market-based method used communication efficiently because it compressed
the UAVs‘ data into bids. The role of the TI, in addition to task creation and holding
auctions, was as a market matcher that matched the sell bids and purchased bids during
the double auctions. The GSs are buyers that participated with the TI and sellers in the
double auctions. This allowed the UAVs to control the allocation process by the bids
they submitted. All GSs participated in auctioning tasks received from the TI to UAVs
that submitted bids to one or more GSs. This gave the UAVs more chances to win the
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auctioned tasks. Therefore, the buyer's cost for executing the task was considered in a
bid that reflected the maximum price the buyer can pay for that task. Thus, the seller‘s
bid is considered the minimum price acceptable to trade the task.
As a global objective, this dissertation used double auctions to minimize the
overall cost. During the auctioning process, the UAV's cost for executing tasks was
considered a bid that did not exceed the auctioneer‘s reserve price. Therefore, more than
one agent may submit the same bid, and the auctioneer‘s role was as tiebreaker. GSs
were bounded by the TI‘s reservation price when submitting their bids to the TI; hence,
they benefitted from the buyers that bid for less in case they did not win the task. Yet
there was still an opportunity for them to receive partial profit in case their buyer agent
became the winner. The GSs used the TI‘s reserve price to come up with their own price
for the auctioned task that was based on their linear distance to the auctioned task, and
the time needed to execute a task by a prospective winner, which was based on the
known speed of the UAVs. UAVs submitted their buy offers to the market (GS in this
situation) according to the market rules; the seller‘s decision was based on the minimum
bid.
For any auctioned task, there is a deadline time for the task data to be received by
the auctioneer. When execution of a candidate task would cause the execution of any
task in the UAV‘s current plan to miss its deadline, the UAV did not submit a bid for that
auctioned task. Thus, data delivery time affected the amount of profit a UAV could earn;
the sooner the task(s) were delivered to the auctioneer, the more profit the UAV
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generated, which was a direct result of the UAV‘s communication range. Increasing the
UAVs‘ communication ranges enabled them to deliver the needed data sooner.
This double auction operated differently than a regular double auction. The
overall objective was to minimize overall costs. Bids were ranked from minimum to the
maximum; the agent with the minimum bid was awarded the task assuming all
constraints were met.
Using the increasing price function, re-auctioning the GSs‘ tasks improved the
quality of the solution because all tasks at the end were bid on and thereafter assigned.
Re-auctioning made the system robust and maintained strong control over all auctioned
tasks regardless of any uncertainty agents might have faced (e.g., UAV communication
malfunction) during task execution. When a UAV was unable to perform its tasks, these
tasks were assigned to other agents through a new auction held by the GS that was
supposed to receive the data on time.
This double auction generated a random number of tasks to be executed by a
different number of UAVs to determine the effect on the quality of the solution. For the
same number of tasks, having more UAVs participate in the auction resulted in a quicker
response by reducing the average distance traveled, and the average time of tasks
execution decreased as well. Increasing the communication ranges also improved the
quality of the solution by reducing the execution time and increasing the profit for each
participant.
Assuming each UAV is self- interested, the total time to complete all the tasks
assigned to it was minimized. Tasks were assigned through bidding according to double
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auction rules. Additionally, communication malfunctions of the UAVs were simulated.
In this research, UAVs could become disabled and so fail to deliver their task(s).
Therefore, UAV malfunctioning introduces new challenges for this system. Since each
UAV is responsible for delivering its won tasks, it will have to assure delivering the
completed tasks to the source GS without any delay to maximize its won profit.
Otherwise, the UAV suffers a severe penalty. The robustness issue was addressed by
introducing a point of failure for some UAVs during task execution. This was done by
disconnecting a UAV before it delivered all or some of its tasks to their final destination.
Since the tasks are time limited, the system‘s robustness was validated by re-auctioning
undelivered tasks(s) by the prospective receiver GS after gamma ( ) time passed since
their due time. However, a disabled UAV could recover from its failure during reauctioning, and if it participated in the bidding of any task(s) on its task list, the UAV
wins those tasks if the UAV was already on its way to deliver the tasks‘ data when it was
disabled.
The GS malfunctioning issue is an area for future research, since the current
constraints made it difficult to handle at this time. Going forward, UAVs may have
different capabilities such as different speeds and different communication ranges;
therefore, research is needed to explore the effect of these on the quality of the solution
and the profit that can be generated. To address relevant issues in double auctions, future
research can also expand on this research by exploring double auctions between GSs in
addition to the combinations (GSs and UAVs) investigated in this research.
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APPENDIX A
DOUBLE AUCTION TRACES

Actual GS communication radius for the overlap case is: 400
TI communication radius: 231

GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
1 475 3 406
2 Inf 3 433
3 Inf 3 447

UAV_Bid

GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV UAV_Bid
1
1105
1
1034
2
1101
1
1032
3
Inf
1
1069
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV UAV_Bid
1
1077
1
907
2
Inf
1
945
3
1085
1
911
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
1 Inf 1 307
2 524 1 307
3 Inf 1 307
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
1 Inf 2 766
2 805 2 735
3 Inf 2 764
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
1 407 2 64

UAV_Bid

UAV_Bid

UAV_Bid
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2 380 2 64
3 Inf 2 64
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
1 Inf 5 939
2 980 5 920
3 Inf 5 942
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
1 561 5 285
2 586 5 297
3 Inf 5 297

UAV_Bid

UAV_Bid

GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV UAV_Bid
1
Inf
9
1343
2
Inf
9
1331
3
1374
9
1304
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV UAV_Bid
1
1158
9
947
2
1179
9
957
3
Inf
9
970
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
1 599 9 133
2 Inf 9 133
3 602 9 133

UAV_Bid

GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV UAV_Bid
1
1077
4
993
2
Inf
4
1014
3
1052
4
981

UAV_TaskList =
Columns 1 through 5
[1x3 double] [1x2 double] [1]

[12] [1x2 double]
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Columns 6 through 9
[] [] [] [1x3 double]
Ground Stations coordinates (in rows):
231 0 0
-115 200 0
-115 -200 0
UAVs Initial Coordinates (in rows):
-114 219 121
-78 199 106
218 28 132
-65 -151 144
-24 -127 169
-52 -144 111
-115 -180 106
-115 -180 119
-115 -180 132
Tasks Coordinates (in rows):
2073
832
759
2297
4431
1144
2802
-3897
1470
-2120
1407
433
-1624
2492
2422
261
1538
1028
-1035
2227
3860
1926
1837
503
-4385
-3825
2759
2814
2401
3910
1079
-1712
1941
567
-3680
3210
RECORDS FOR UAV1:
Tasklist:
2 3 4
Minimum Route:
1 4 2 3

1

StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime
22
2063
2041
2581
RECORDS FOR UAV2:
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Tasklist:
5 6
Minimum Route:
2 6 5 2
StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime
22
749
727
1868
RECORDS FOR UAV3:
Tasklist:
1
Minimum Route:
3 1 1
StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime
22
391
369
2359
RECORDS FOR UAV4:
Tasklist:
12
Minimum Route:
4 12 3
StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime
22
914
892
4916
RECORDS FOR UAV5:
Tasklist:
7 8
Minimum Route:
5 7 8 1
StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime
22
1117
1095
2709
RECORDS FOR UAV9:
Tasklist:
9 10 11
Minimum Route:
9 9 11 10

1
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StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime
22
2189
2167
2804
UAV LIST FOR GS1:
3 1 5 9 9
UAV LIST FOR GS2:
1 1 2 2 5
UAV LIST FOR GS3:
9 4
AvgDist(m) AvgTime(s) Dist_std(m) Time_std(s)
8101
810
8378
838

RESULTS FROM THE ROBUSTNESS
Records for the disconnected UAV:
UAV Disconnected = 1
Time it got eliminated = 50
Time it recovered = 4400
Its latest task delivery time = 2581
Tasks in its tasklist are:
4 2 3
Tasks delivered are:
None
Tasks undelivered are:
4 2 3

TIME AT WHICH THE REAUCTION OF TASKS FROM THE DISCONNECTED
UAV BEGINS: 2586
THE REMAINING TASKS TO BE DONE BY ALL THE OTHER UAV JUS T
BEFORE THE REAUCTION OF TASKS FROM THE DISCONNECTED, UAV1:
The remaining tasks for UAV 2 are: None
The remaining tasks for UAV 3 are: None
The remaining tasks for UAV 4 are: None
The remaining tasks for UAV 5 are: None
The remaining tasks for UAV 6 are: None
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The remaining tasks for UAV 7 are: None
The remaining tasks for UAV 8 are: None
The remaining tasks for UAV 9 are: None
UAVs current coordinates just before the reauction of tasks from the eliminated UAV:
-353 361 158
-115 200 0
232 1 1
-115 -200 0
232 1 0
-52 -144 111
-115 -180 106
-115 -180 119
232 1 2
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
1 Inf 2 503
2 524 1 425
3 Inf 1 450

UAV_Bid

GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV UAV_Bid
1
1105
2
1038
2
1101
2
1036
3
Inf
2
1074
GSs and UAVs bid pairs:
GS
GS_Bid
UAV UAV_Bid
1
1077
2
907
2
Inf
2
945
3
1085
2
911
RECORDS FOR UAVs WHICH WON REAUCTIONED TASK(S):
(Note: Those UAVs which did not win any reacuctioned tasks have the same records as
shown before)
UAV1:
TASKLIST:
Task completed before REAUCTION:
Task completed after REAUCTION:
4
Minimum Route from start to end:
1 4 2
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StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime
22
2977
415
5117
UAV2:
TASKLIST:
Task completed before REAUCTION:
6 5
Task completed after REAUCTION:
2 3
Minimum Route from start to end:
2 6 5 2 3 1
StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime
22
4356
2493
1868
UAV LIST FOR GS1:
3 5 9 9 2
UAV LIST FOR GS2:
2 2 5 1 2
UAV LIST FOR GS3:
9 4
AvgDist(m) AvgTime(s) Dist_std(m) Time_std(s)
8257
826
9407
941

Ground Stations coordinates (in rows):
231
0
0
-115
200
0
-115 -200
0
UAVs and Tasks coordinates:

9 UAVs
UAVs Initial Coordinates (in rows):
69
114
138
-97
210
100
-89
205
146
-8
-118 136
-58
-147 155
68
-74
160
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-115
-115
-115

-180
-180
-180

143
166
112

20 Tasks
Tasks coordinates (in rows):
3148
-613
4706
-544
-3731
2547
4134
1551
4158
2655
2922
853
4058
-3374
4595
-102
469
2094
1324
4598
-4025
-3132
-2215
-1185
4576
2952
3003
-2762
-146
-3810
-782
1463
4572
-16
-3581
-2240
-3424
1797
4649
-1596

4615
2990
3855
405
1679
2995
1985
702
4694
2906
954
3973
1917
2119
2533
2818
600
3871
3072
4214

Ground Stations coordinates (in rows):
231
0
0
-115
200
0
-115 -200
0

6 UAVs
UAVs Initial Coordinates (in rows):
17
144
115
37
132
139
131
-38
113
146
-29
153
-115 -180
177
-115 -180
127
12 Tasks
Tasks coordinates (in rows):
2073
832
2297
4431

759
1144
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2802
-2120
-1624
261
-1035
1926
-4385
2814
1079
567

-3897
1407
2492
1538
2227
1837
-3825
2401
-1712
-3680

1470
433
2422
1028
3860
503
2759
3910
1941
3210
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APPENDIX B
CODE

File CalUAVDistance
function DistTravelled = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed,
TimeTaskStart,NegTIME,TaskDeliveryTime)
% Computes the instaneous distance travelled by UAV
% NegTIME is the instance at which negotiation is to happen
if NegTIME<=TimeTaskStart
DistTravelled = 0;
else
DistTravelled =
UAV_Speed*(min(NegTIME,TaskDeliveryTime)-TimeTaskStart);
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

File CalUAVsNegBids
function [UAVNegPath,PathCostNeg] =
CalUAVsNegBids(DistTravel_UAVi,UAVi_MovingTo,...
UAVj_MovingTo,GS_UAVi_RouteCords,GS_UAVj_RouteCords,UAVi_NewLocation,..
.
UAVj_NewLocation,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeHistory,ROUTEi
d_j,Deadlines,GS_UAViRoutes)
%%% UAVi negotiating a task
global TaskName
UAVNegPath = [];
PathCostNeg = inf;
if DistTravel_UAVi>0
TaskToNeg_i = GS_UAVi_RouteCords(UAVi_MovingTo,:);
TaskName = GS_UAViRoutes(UAVi_MovingTo);
%%% compute the cost of the UAVs to the tasks
UAVi_NegBid = norm(TaskToNeg_i-UAVi_NewLocation)*DistUnitCost +
norm(TaskToNeg_i-UAVi_NewLocation)*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed; % in USD
UAVj_NegBid = norm(TaskToNeg_i-UAVj_NewLocation)*DistUnitCost +
norm(TaskToNeg_i-UAVj_NewLocation)*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed; % in USD
if UAVj_NegBid<UAVi_NegBid
TempUAVjRoute = [GS_UAVj_RouteCords(1:UAVj_MovingTo1,:);UAVj_NewLocation;TaskToNeg_i;GS_UAVj_RouteCords(1:UAVj_MovingTo,:)
];
%%% computing the cost of the new path
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NegPathDist_j = ComputeNegPathDistance(TempUAVjRoute);
function called to compute path distance

%% a

PathTimeNeg_j = NegPathDist_j/UAV_Speed;
PathCostNeg = NegPathDist_j*DistUnitCost +
PathTimeNeg_j*TimeUnitCost; % in USD
TaskCompletionTimeNeg_j = TimeHistory(ROUTEid_j,1)+
PathTimeNeg_j;
if
TaskCompletionTimeNeg_j<=TimeHistory(ROUTEid_j,3)&&TaskCompletionTimeNe
g_j<=Deadlines(TaskName)
UAVNegPath = TempUAVjRoute;
% GS_UAVi_RouteCords(UAVi_MovingTo,:) = [];
end
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%
%%% UAVj negotiating a task
% if DistTravel_UAVj>0
%
TaskToNeg_j = GS_UAVj_RouteCords(UAVj_MovingTo,:);
%
%%% compute the cost of the UAVs to the tasks
%
UAVj_NegBid = norm(TaskToNeg_j-UAVj_NewLocation)*DistUnitCost +
norm(TaskToNeg_j-UAVj_NewLocation)*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed; % in USD
%
UAVi_NegBid = norm(TaskToNeg_j-UAVi_NewLocation)*DistUnitCost +
norm(TaskToNeg_j-UAVi_NewLocation)*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed; % in USD
%
if UAVi_NegBid<UAVj_NegBid
%
TempUAViRoute = [GS_UAVi_RouteCords(1:UAVi_MovingTo1,:);UAVi_NewLocation;TaskToNeg_j;GS_UAVi_RouteCords(1:UAVi_MovingTo,:)
];
%
%%% computing the cost of the new path
%
NegPathDist_i = ComputeNegPathDistance(TempUAViRoute); %% a
function called to compute path distance
%
%
PathTimeNeg_i = NegPathDist_i/UAV_Speed;
%
PathCostNeg_i = NegPathDist_i*DistUnitCost +
PathTimeNeg_i*TimeUnitCost; % in USD
%
TaskCompletionTimeNeg_i = TimeHistory(ROUTEid_i,1)+
PathTimeNeg_i;
%
if TaskCompletionTimeNeg_i<=TimeHistory(ROUTEid_j,3)
%
GS_UAVi_RouteCords = TempUAViRoute;
%
GS_UAVj_RouteCords(UAVi_MovingTo,:) = [];
%
end
%
end
% end

File
function NegPathDist = ComputeNegPathDistance(TempUAVRoute)
% computes the distance of the new path formed by adding a new task
from
% another UAV
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NegPathDist = 0;
for i =1:size(TempUAVRoute,1)-1
NegPathDist = NegPathDist + norm(TempUAVRoute(i+1,:)TempUAVRoute(i,:));
end

File
function [RouteLenghts,CumRouteLenghts] =
ComputeSegmentDistance(GS_UAVRouteCordAll,GS_UAVRoutesAll)
global GS_UAVCommStrength GS_CommRange UAV_CommRange;
RouteLenghts = [];
CumRouteLenghts = [];
NumberOfRoutes = length(GS_UAVRoutesAll);
for u=1:NumberOfRoutes
RouteLenghts{u}(:,1) = 0;
NumOfPoints = size(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{u},1);
%if NumOfPoints>2 % Avoid dealing with a route with no task
for r = 1:NumOfPoints-1
RouteLenghts{u}(:,r+1) = norm(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{u}(r+1,:)GS_UAVRouteCordAll{u}(r,:));
end
RouteLenghts{u}(:,NumOfPoints)= RouteLenghts{u}(:,r+1)-(1GS_UAVCommStrength)*(GS_CommRange+UAV_CommRange);
CumRouteLenghts{u} = cumsum(RouteLenghts{u}); % zero included for
reference purposes
%end
end

File
function GS_Cord = CreateAllGroundStations(NumberOfGS, TI,
TI_CommRange, GS_CommRange,Scenario)
GS_AngleChange = 2*pi/NumberOfGS; % Angular displacement between anay
two GS from TI
GS_Angle = [1:NumberOfGS].*GS_AngleChange; % The angles at which the
Manager distributes the GS
if Scenario ==1
GS_Angle = [0,pi/2,pi];
% FAR APART
RADIUS = 0.9 *(TI_CommRange+GS_CommRange);
GS_X = RADIUS.*cos(GS_Angle)+ TI(:,1);
GS_Y = RADIUS.*sin(GS_Angle) + TI(:,2);
elseif Scenario ==2
% INTERSECT
GS_X = [0, GS_CommRange, -GS_CommRange ]+ TI(:,1);
GS_Y = [2*GS_CommRange, GS_CommRange, GS_CommRange ] + TI(:,2);
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elseif Scenario ==3
% TANGENT
RADIUS = 2*GS_CommRange/sqrt(3);
GS_X = RADIUS.*cos(GS_Angle)+ TI(:,1);
GS_Y = RADIUS.*sin(GS_Angle) + TI(:,2);
end
GS_Z = zeros(1,NumberOfGS);
GS_Cord = [GS_X',GS_Y',GS_Z'];

File
function UAVsAll = CreateAllUAVs(NumberOfUAVs,TI_CommRange,
UAV_CommRange,UAVCommStrength,UAVAngleFromTI,TI)

% This function creates Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and displays them in
such
% a way that at each Ground Station(i.e. GS) has at least one UAV in
its
% communication range
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% The initial angles at which the UAVs are distributed from the TI
ChangeInTeta_TI = 2*pi/NumberOfUAVs;
Teta_TI_UAVs = [1:NumberOfUAVs].* ChangeInTeta_TI; % X-axis angle
Dist_TI_UAVs = UAVCommStrength*(TI_CommRange + UAV_CommRange);
UAV_X = cos(UAVAngleFromTI)*Dist_TI_UAVs.*cos(Teta_TI_UAVs) +
TI(1,1);
UAV_Y = cos(UAVAngleFromTI)*Dist_TI_UAVs.*sin(Teta_TI_UAVs) +
TI(1,2);
Z_Value = Dist_TI_UAVs.*sin(UAVAngleFromTI) + TI(1,3);
UAV_Z(:,1:NumberOfUAVs) = Z_Value;
UAVsAll = [UAV_X',UAV_Y',UAV_Z'];

File
function [GS_Cord, GS_CommRange,TI_CommRange] =
CreateGroundStations(NumberOfGS, TI,TangGS_CommRange,Scenario,
GS_GS_CommStrength)
GS_Angle = [0,2*pi/3, 4*pi/3];
RADIUS = 2*TangGS_CommRange/sqrt(3); % radius at which all three GSs
are tangential
GS_X = RADIUS.*cos(GS_Angle)+ TI(:,1);
GS_Y = RADIUS.*sin(GS_Angle) + TI(:,2);
GS_Z = zeros(1,NumberOfGS)+ TI(:,3);
GS_Cord = [GS_X',GS_Y',GS_Z'];
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if Scenario ==1
% FAR APART
GS_CommRange = GS_GS_CommStrength*TangGS_CommRange;
elseif Scenario ==2 % INTERSECT
GS_CommRange = (1 + GS_GS_CommStrength)*TangGS_CommRange;
elseif Scenario ==3 % TANGENT
GS_CommRange = TangGS_CommRange;
end
TI_CommRange = RADIUS; %(RADIUS/GS_TI_CommStrength) - GS_CommRange;

File
function [GS_UAVs_Route,UAVs_Route,UAVRouteCord,ID_UAVs,
UAVTaskStartTime, UAVTaskEndTime] =
DisplayUAVTaskList(WinnerUAV_Route,UAVs, GS_Cord,
Task,WinnerPathTime,TaskCreationTimes)
global UAVsNames Count GS_UAVRoutesAll Counter GS_UAVRouteCordAll
Deadlines TimeHistory
Route = [];
Count = 0;
UAVRouteCord = [];
TimeForTaskExecution = [];
ID_UAVs = [];
for m=1:length(WinnerUAV_Route)
if ~isempty(WinnerUAV_Route{m})
Count = Count + 1;
Counter = Counter + 1;
UAVs_Route{Count} = WinnerUAV_Route{m};
Route = UAVs_Route{Count};
GS_UAVs_Route{Count} = UAVs_Route{Count};
GS_UAVs_Route{Count}(1,1) = UAVsNames(Route(1));
GS_UAVRoutesAll{Counter} = GS_UAVs_Route{Count};
TimeForTaskExecution(Count) = round(WinnerPathTime(Route(1),:));
TaskList = Route(:,2:end-1);
UAVTaskStartTime(Count,:) = TaskCreationTimes(TaskList(1)); % time
at which UAV begins executing task
UAVTaskEndTime(Count,:) = UAVTaskStartTime(Count,:) +
TimeForTaskExecution(Count); % time at which UAV ends its task
disp(sprintf('The Task List for UAV %s is: %s, Tasks start time is
%d and Task delivery time is %.0d'...
,num2str(UAVsNames(Route(1))),
num2str(TaskList),UAVTaskStartTime(Count,:), UAVTaskEndTime(Count,:)))
UAVRouteCord{Count} = [UAVs(Route(1),:); Task(Route(2:end1),:);GS_Cord(Route(end),:)];
ID_UAVs = [ID_UAVs;UAVsNames(Route(1))];
LatestDeliveryTime = min(Deadlines(Route(2:end-1)));
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{Counter} = UAVRouteCord{Count};
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TimeHistory(Counter,:) = [UAVTaskStartTime(Count,:),
UAVTaskEndTime(Count,:),LatestDeliveryTime];
end
end

File
function [UAVNewLocation, PointMovingTo, LastTaskDone]=
FindUAVnewLocation(UAVCumRouteLenghts, GS_UAVRouteCords,
RouteLenghts,DistTravelled)
global

GS_CommRange UAV_CommRange GS_UAVCommStrength

UAVNewLocation = [];
LastTaskDone = 0; % no task is done
if DistTravelled==0
UAVNewLocation = GS_UAVRouteCords(1,:); % UAV initial coordinate
PointMovingTo = 1;
else
for i =1:length(UAVCumRouteLenghts)
if DistTravelled < UAVCumRouteLenghts(i)
PointMovingTo = i;
DistFromPreviousPoint = DistTravelled UAVCumRouteLenghts(PointMovingTo-1);
DirectionVector = GS_UAVRouteCords(PointMovingTo,:)GS_UAVRouteCords(PointMovingTo-1,:);
UAVNewLocation = GS_UAVRouteCords(PointMovingTo-1,:) +
(DistFromPreviousPoint/RouteLenghts(PointMovingTo))*DirectionVector;
if PointMovingTo > 2
LastTaskDone = PointMovingTo - 2; % number of tasks done (Note:
not necesarily task IDs)
end
break;
end
end
if isempty(UAVNewLocation)

DirectionVector = GS_UAVRouteCords(end,:)-GS_UAVRouteCords(end1,:);
DistFromPreviousPoint = norm(GS_UAVRouteCords(end,:)GS_UAVRouteCords(end-1,:))-(1GS_UAVCommStrength)*(GS_CommRange+UAV_CommRange);
UAVNewLocation = GS_UAVRouteCords(end-1,:) +
(DistFromPreviousPoint/DistFromPreviousPoint)*DirectionVector; % UAV
has finished its tasks and arrived at the GS
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%
UAVNewLocation = GS_UAVRouteCords(end,:); % UAV has finished its
tasks and arrived at the GS
LastTaskDone = length(UAVCumRouteLenghts) - 2; % 2, because we
have one UAV and one GS coordinates
PointMovingTo = length(UAVCumRouteLenghts);
end
end

File
function RandUAVs =
GenerateRandUAVs(NumberOfGS,NumberOfUAVs,GS_Cord,TangGS_CommRange,UAV_C
ommRangeMin)
Lines = nchoosek(1:NumberOfGS,2); % lines connecting the centre of the
GSs
NumOfLines = size(Lines,1);
NumOfRandUAV = zeros(1,NumOfLines);
NumOfRandUAV(1:NumOfLines-1) =
repmat(floor(NumberOfUAVs/NumberOfGS),1,NumOfLines-1);
NumOfRandUAV(NumOfLines) = NumberOfUAVs sum(NumOfRandUAV(1:NumOfLines-1)); %% Last GS pair takes the remaining
UAVs
TempUAVs = [];
for i=1:NumOfLines
x1 = GS_Cord(Lines(i,1),1);
y1 = GS_Cord(Lines(i,1),2);
x2 = GS_Cord(Lines(i,2),1);
y2 = GS_Cord(Lines(i,2),2);
if max(x1,x2)-min(x1,x2)< NumOfRandUAV(i)
UAV_X = repmat(min(x1,x2),1,NumOfRandUAV(i));
else
UAV_X = randsample(min(x1,x2):max(x1,x2),NumOfRandUAV(i));
end
UAV_Y = ((y2- y1)/(x2-x1)).*(UAV_X-x1)+ y1 + 0.1*TangGS_CommRange;
UAV_Z = randsample(0.5*TangGS_CommRange:0.4*(TangGS_CommRange +
UAV_CommRangeMin),NumOfRandUAV(i));
TempUAVs = [TempUAVs ;[UAV_X',UAV_Y',UAV_Z']];
end
RandUAVs = TempUAVs;
FileName =
strcat(num2str(NumberOfUAVs),'RandUAVs_',num2str(UAV_CommRangeMin));
save (FileName, 'RandUAVs')
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
UAVsCommWithGS{NumberOfGS} = [];
for g=1:NumberOfGS
DistOfUAVfromGS = sqrt(sum((bsxfun(@minus, GS_Cord(g,:),
RandUAVs)).^2,2));
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% Temp = find(DistOfUAVfromGS<=(TangGS_CommRange + UAV_CommRangeMin));
for j=1:NumberOfUAVs
if DistOfUAVfromGS(j)<=(TangGS_CommRange + UAV_CommRangeMin)
UAVsCommWithGS{g} = [UAVsCommWithGS{g},j];
%
break
end
end
end
disp('COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GSs and UAVs')
for g=1:NumberOfGS
disp(strcat('UAV communicating with GS', num2str(g)))
disp(UAVsCommWithGS{g})
end

File
function RandTasks = GenerateTask()
UAV_CommRangeMax = 2500;
NumOfTasks = 20;
Xmin= -2*UAV_CommRangeMax;
Xmax= 2*UAV_CommRangeMax;
Ymin= -2*UAV_CommRangeMax;
Ymax = 2*UAV_CommRangeMax;
Zmin = 0;%TangGS_CommRange+UAV_CommRangeMin;
Zmax = 2*UAV_CommRangeMax;
X_Cords = randsample(Xmin:Xmax, NumOfTasks);
Y_Cords = randsample(Ymin:Ymax, NumOfTasks);
Z_Cords = randsample(Zmin:Zmax, NumOfTasks);
RandTasks = [X_Cords',Y_Cords',Z_Cords'];
FileName = strcat('RandTasks_',num2str(NumOfTasks));
save (FileName, 'RandTasks')

File
function GS_Bids = GS_Bidding(NumberOfGS, TI, Task,
GS_Cord,TI_CommRange,GS_CommRange,UAV_Speed,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,
TI_TaskCost,Task_id)
% This function computes the the cost for Ground Station(GS) to perform
a given
% task and makes a list of the tasks won by each GS
GS_Bids = [];
Po = [];
Alpha = 0.5; % 0<Alpha<1
for i=1:NumberOfGS
%
CommCheck = norm(TI- GS_Cord(i,:)); % checking to see if GS
and TI are in communication range
%
if CommCheck<=(TI_CommRange + GS_CommRange)
%
GS_TaskDist = norm(Task-GS_Cord(i,:)); % distance between the
task and the ground station
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%
GS_TaskDistCost = DistUnitCost*(GS_TaskDist); % (in USD) % Take
note
%
GS_TaskTime = GS_TaskDist/UAV_Speed;
%
TGS_TaskTimeCost = GS_TaskTime*TimeUnitCost; % (in USD)
%
Po(:,i) = 2*(GS_TaskDistCost + TGS_TaskTimeCost); %2*norm(TaskGS_Cord(i,:))*DistUnitCost; % price from the task
Po(:,i) = 2*(norm(Task-GS_Cord(i,:))*DistUnitCost + norm(TaskGS_Cord(i,:))*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed); % cost in USD
%
GS_Cost = Alpha*Po(:,i) + (GS_TaskDistCost +
TGS_TaskTimeCost)*(1-Alpha); % GS bid for a task
GS_Cost

= Po(:,i);

if GS_Cost<=TI_TaskCost(Task_id)
GS_Bids(:,i) = GS_Cost; %GS_Bids(:,i); %GS_Cost;
else
GS_Bids(:,i) = Inf;
end
end
% [Po TI_TaskCost(Task_id)]

File
function PlotTheSpaceWithTheAgents(GS_Cord, GS_CommRange,
NumberOfGS,TI_CommRange, TI,UAVs,NumberOfUAVs)
figure('Name','GS and TI communication ranges, Tasks and UAVs')
plot3(UAVs(:,1),UAVs(:,2),UAVs(:,3),'*')
uavnames = 1:NumberOfUAVs;
text(UAVs(:,1),UAVs(:,2),UAVs(:,3),num2str(uavnames'))
hold on
plot3(GS_Cord(:,1),GS_Cord(:,2),GS_Cord(:,3),'o')
hold on
plot3(TI(:,1),TI(:,2),TI(:,3),'s')
% hold on
% plot3(Task(:,1),Task(:,2),Task(:,3),'')
legend('UAV','GS','TI')
xlabel('x')
ylabel('y')
zlabel('z')
hold on
COL =['r';'b';'g';'m'];
for i =1:NumberOfGS
% use to plot a circle for the GS communication ranges
N =256;
t = (0:N)*2*pi/N;
Z = zeros(1,N+1);
plot3(GS_CommRange*cos(t)+GS_Cord(i,1),
GS_CommRange*sin(t)+GS_Cord(i,2),Z,COL(i,:))
hold on
plot(GS_Cord(i,1),GS_Cord(i,2),strcat(COL(i,:),'o'))
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text(GS_Cord(i,1),GS_Cord(i,2),strcat('GS',num2str(i)))
hold on
end
plot3(TI_CommRange*cos(t)+TI(:,1),
TI_CommRange*sin(t)+TI(:,2),Z,COL(4,:))
plot(TI(:,1),TI(:,2),strcat(COL(4,:),'o'))
text(TI(:,1),TI(:,2),'TI')
grid on
hold on

File
% The function tries to distribute the tasks for a given UAV to other
UAVs
function Robustness(UAV_ID_Eliminate, UAV_Elimination_Time,
UAVRecoveryTime, GS_UAVRoutesAll,...
TimeHistory, GS_UAVRouteCordAll,
UAVTasksCompletionDurations,AllTaskDeadlines)
% GS_UAVRoutesAll contains all the UAVs' routes (i.e. from UAV->Task>GS)
% TimeHistory contains the task start time , delivery time and the
latest
% time the task could be delivered without timeout
% UAV_ID_Eliminate is UAV to be eliminated due to injury
% UAVRecoveryTime > UAV_Disconnection_Time
global TI_CostScalar InitNumberOfTask CycleAuctionCloseTime
tH_Robust = AllTaskDeadlines;
% Making sure the UAVRecoveryTime and UAV_Disconnection_Time are valid
while (UAVRecoveryTime < UAV_Elimination_Time)
disp('UAVRecoveryTime must be more than UAV_Elimination_Time and
both must be greater than zero')
UAV_Elimination_Time = input('Please enter UAV_Elimination_Time:
');
UAVRecoveryTime = input('Please enter the UAVRecoveryTime:
');
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
global GS_CommRange NumberOfGS TI_CommRange TI UAV_CommRange GS_History
Task UAV_Speed WinnerUAV_RouteOld TangGS_CommRange
GS_UAVCommStrength...
DistUnitCost TimeUnitCost NumberOfUAVs TaskAuctionTimesOld GS_Cord
Up AuctionTimeStep TI_id WinnerPathTimeOld GS_UAVList UAVs
global SellAndBuyBids M_BuyBid SellAndBuyWinners SellAndBuyWinnerBids
TI_TaskCost GS_jUAV_SBids TaskCreationTime Scenario Gamma OriginalUAV
OriginalGS
% Note: Gamma is a fraction of latest delivery time of task by
eliminated UAV
NumberOfUAVsAll = NumberOfUAVs;
% Find the UAV to be disconnected
UAVs_CurrentLocations = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,3);
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UAVsWithTasks = [];
RemainingPathTime = UAVTasksCompletionDurations;
%zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1);
DeadTimes = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1);
UAV_TaskListRemaining = []; % tasks unvisisted prior to the UAV's
disconnection
NumOfTasks = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1);
for j = 1: length(GS_UAVRoutesAll)
if ~isempty(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j})
NumOfTasks(j,:) = length(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}) - 2; % stores the
number of tasks in the tasklist of each UAV
%
UAVsWithTasks
= [UAVsWithTasks; GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(1)]; % UAV
IDS basically
DeadTimes(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(1),:) =
min(AllTaskDeadlines(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:end-1))); % stores the time
for the last auctioned tasks for each route
%
GS_id(j,:) = GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(end);
else
UAVs_CurrentLocations(j,:) = UAVs(j,:); % UAV does not
move if it wins no task
end
end

% Checking to make sure the UAV entered is valid and has some task(s)
ValidUAV_IDChecker = 0;
while (ValidUAV_IDChecker==0)
%
ROUTEidToDelete = find( UAVsWithTasks == UAV_ID_Eliminate);
if isempty(GS_UAVRoutesAll{UAV_ID_Eliminate})
disp('The UAV you have entered does not exist or has no task;
taking it out has no impact on the system.')
UAV_ID_Eliminate = input('Please enter another UAVid (any
number from 1 through 9):
'); % There are 9 UAVs
ValidUAV_IDChecker = 0;
else
ValidUAV_IDChecker = 1;
ROUTEidToDelete = UAV_ID_Eliminate;
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
RouteToDelete = GS_UAVRoutesAll{ROUTEidToDelete}; % contains the UAV,
its tasks, and the GS to deliver to
TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate = RouteToDelete(2:end-1); % Task IDs from the
eliminated UAV
% NumOfTasks = length(TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate);
LatestTasksDeliveryTime = TimeHistory(ROUTEidToDelete, 4);
TimeToReAuctionTasks = round((1 + Gamma)*LatestTasksDeliveryTime); %
time to restart auctioning taks from the eliminated UAV
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TimeToBeginReAuctionTasks = TimeToReAuctionTasks;
% Compute the new location of the UAV prior to its elimination (i.e.
deletion)
DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed,
TimeHistory(ROUTEidToDelete,1),UAV_Elimination_Time,TimeHistory(ROUTEid
ToDelete,2));
Temp1{1} = GS_UAVRouteCordAll{ROUTEidToDelete}; % take note of
{RouteToDelete};
Temp2{1} = GS_UAVRoutesAll{ROUTEidToDelete};
% take note of
{RouteToDelete};
[RouteLenghts,UAVCumRouteLenghts] = ComputeSegmentDistance(Temp1,
Temp2);
Temp3 = GS_UAVRouteCordAll{ROUTEidToDelete};
% take note of
{RouteToDelete};
Temp4 = UAVCumRouteLenghts{1};
Temp5 = RouteLenghts{1};
[UAVNewLocation1, PointMovingTo, LastTaskDone] =
FindUAVnewLocation(Temp4, Temp3, Temp5,DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate);
% Compute UAV new location after the UAV has recovered and moved
towards
% the remaining tasks
if UAVRecoveryTime < TimeToReAuctionTasks
EarliestExpDeliveryTime =
TimeHistory(ROUTEidToDelete,2)+(UAVRecoveryTime-UAV_Elimination_Time);
DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate2 = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed,
UAVRecoveryTime, TimeToReAuctionTasks,EarliestExpDeliveryTime);
TotalDist = DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate + DistByUAV_ID_Eliminate2;
[UAVNewLocation2, PointMovingTo, LastTaskDone] =
FindUAVnewLocation(Temp4, Temp3, Temp5, TotalDist);
UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAV_ID_Eliminate, :) = UAVNewLocation2;
else
UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAV_ID_Eliminate, :) = UAVNewLocation1;
UAVNewLocation2 = UAVNewLocation1;
end

UAV_GS_CommChecker = UAV_CommRange + GS_CommRange;
Store1 = GS_UAVRouteCordAll{ROUTEidToDelete}(end,:); % GS co-ordinates
if (LastTaskDone>0) && (LastTaskDone < NumOfTasks(ROUTEidToDelete))
&&((norm(Store1- UAVNewLocation2)<=(UAV_GS_CommChecker))) % check
communication
TasksUnDelivered = TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate(LastTaskDone+1:end); %
these tasks have to be re-auctioned to the existing UAVs
elseif LastTaskDone < 1
TasksUnDelivered = TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate;
elseif (LastTaskDone==NumOfTasks(ROUTEidToDelete)) &&
((norm(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{ROUTEidToDelete}(end,:)UAVNewLocation2)<=(UAV_GS_CommChecker)))
TasksUnDelivered = []; % all tasks are delivered.
else
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TasksUnDelivered = TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate;
end
TasksDelivered =
TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate(1:length(TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate)length(TasksUnDelivered));
%TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate(length(TasksUnDelivered)+1:end);
% Display some statistics for the disconnected UAV
disp('Records for the disconnected UAV:')
disp(sprintf('UAV Disconnected = %d', UAV_ID_Eliminate))
disp(sprintf('Time it got eliminated = %d', UAV_Elimination_Time))
disp(sprintf('Time it recovered = %d', UAVRecoveryTime))
disp(sprintf('Its latest task delivery time = %d',
LatestTasksDeliveryTime))
disp('Tasks in its tasklist are:')
disp(TasksForUAV_ID_Eliminate)
disp('Tasks delivered are:')
if isempty(TasksDelivered)
disp('None')
else
disp(TasksDelivered)
end

disp('Tasks undelivered are:')
if isempty(TasksUnDelivered)
disp('none')
else
disp(TasksUnDelivered)
end
disp(sprintf('\n'))
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

% Computing the remaining tasks to be done by the existing UAVs at the
point of reauctioning of the tasks undelivered by the disconnected UAV
% Initialize the task lists
UAV_TaskListRemaining{NumberOfUAVsAll} = [];
% UAV_TaskListRemaining{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = TasksUnDelivered;
RemainingPathTime = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1); %initialization
% WinnerUAV_Route{NumberOfUAVsAll} = [];
UAV_TaskListCompleted{NumberOfUAVsAll} = [];
UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = TasksDelivered;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% Find the remaining tasks for UAVs with tasks
TaskAuctionTimes = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1);
WinnerPathTimeOld = zeros(NumberOfUAVsAll,1);
last =[];
for j = 1: NumberOfUAVsAll %length(UAVsWithTasks)
if j~=UAV_ID_Eliminate % avoid doing for eliminated UAV
if ~isempty(GS_UAVRoutesAll{j})
Distance = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed, TimeHistory(j,1),
TimeToReAuctionTasks,TimeHistory(j,2));
Temp6{1} = GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j};
Temp7{1} = GS_UAVRoutesAll{j};
[RouteLenghts,UAVCumRouteLenghts] =
ComputeSegmentDistance(Temp6, Temp7);
%
[j,Distance,UAVCumRouteLenghts{1}(end)]
[UAVs_CurrentLocations(j,:), PointMovingTo, LastTaskDone] =
FindUAVnewLocation(UAVCumRouteLenghts{1}, GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j},
RouteLenghts{1},Distance);
if LastTaskDone>0 && LastTaskDone <= NumOfTasks(j)
UAV_TaskListCompleted{j} =
GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:LastTaskDone+1);
GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:LastTaskDone+1) = []; % delete
tasks IDs visited
UAV_TaskListRemaining{j} = GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:end-1);
% UAV_TaskListRemaining contains remaining task to be done
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j}(2:LastTaskDone+1, :) = []; %
delete the coordinates of tasks visited
WinnerPathTimeOld(j) =
min(TimeToReAuctionTasks,TimeHistory(j,2))-TimeHistory(j,1); % time
already travelled.
%
last = [last; [j NumOfTasks(j) LastTaskDone
UAV_TaskListRemaining{j}]]
elseif LastTaskDone==0
UAV_TaskListRemaining{j} = GS_UAVRoutesAll{j}(2:end-1);
UAV_TaskListCompleted{j} = [];
%
WinnerPathTimeOld(j) = TimeToReAuctionTasksTimeHistory(j,1); % time elapsed.
end
if TimeToReAuctionTasks < TimeHistory(j,2) % less than
earliest delivery time
RemainingPathTime(j,:) = TimeHistory(j,2) TimeToReAuctionTasks; % time remaining to be travelled.
end
else
UAV_TaskListRemaining{j} = [];
end
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end
end

% WinnerPathTimeOld(4)
RemainingPathTime(UAV_ID_Eliminate,:) =
TimeHistory(UAV_ID_Eliminate,2) - UAV_Elimination_Time; % time
remaining to be travelled.
UAV_TaskListRemaining{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = []; % the remaining tasks for
the deleted UAV are the undelivered tasks
WinnerPathTimeOld( UAV_ID_Eliminate) = UAV_Elimination_Time TimeHistory(UAV_ID_Eliminate,1); % time already travelled.
% WinnerPathTimeOld( UAV_ID_Eliminate) =
TimeHistory(UAV_ID_Eliminate,2) - TimeHistory(UAV_ID_Eliminate,1);
disp(sprintf('TIME AT WHICH THE REAUCTION OF TASKS FROM THE
DISCONNECTED UAV BEGINS: %s',
num2str(round(TimeToBeginReAuctionTasks))))
disp(sprintf('THE REMAINING TASKS TO BE DONE BY ALL THE OTHER UAV JUST
BEFORE THE REAUCTION OF TASKS FROM THE DISCONNECTED, UAV%s:',
num2str(UAV_ID_Eliminate)))
for i=1:NumberOfUAVsAll
if i~=UAV_ID_Eliminate % avoid doing for eliminated UAV
if isempty(UAV_TaskListRemaining{i})
disp(sprintf('The remaining tasks for UAV %s are: %s',
num2str(i), 'None'))
GS_UAVRoutesAll{i} = [];
else
disp(sprintf('The remaining tasks for UAV %s are: %s',
num2str(i), num2str(UAV_TaskListRemaining{i})))
TaskAuctionTimes(UAV_TaskListRemaining{i}) =
TimeToReAuctionTasks + (0:length(UAV_TaskListRemaining{i})1).*AuctionTimeStep;
end
end
end
GS_UAVRoutesAll{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = []; % deleted UAV has no route
until it recovers and wins some tasks.
disp(sprintf('\n'))

disp('UAVs current coordinates just before the reauction of tasks from
the eliminated UAV:')
disp(round(UAVs_CurrentLocations))
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% The reauctioning of the undelivered tasks from the disconnected UAVs
PreviousGSTaskAuctionTimes = TaskAuctionTimes; % keeps the times the
tasks were originally sold to the UAVs.
for gs=1:NumberOfGS
TempGS_UAVlist = GS_UAVList{gs};
GS(gs).UAV_Route = GS_UAVRoutesAll;
TempGS_UAVlist(find(TempGS_UAVlist==UAV_ID_Eliminate))=[];
GS_UAVList{gs} = TempGS_UAVlist; % deleted UAV eliminated
end
WinnerUAV_Route = GS_UAVRoutesAll; % New UAV routes ( initialization )
WinnerPathTime = RemainingPathTime; % initialization
UAV_TaskListNew = UAV_TaskListRemaining;
if isempty(TasksUnDelivered)
ReauctionCloseTime = 0;
disp('All the tasks have already been delivered by the disconnected
UAV before the reauctioning time')
else
Start_t = TimeToBeginReAuctionTasks - AuctionTimeStep; %
initialization
%
GS_UAVList{NumberOfGS} = []; % initialization
WinnerUAVsIDs = [];
UAVsBids = [];
CycleCount = 0;
UnsoldTaskIDs = TasksUnDelivered;
InitReAuctioneTimes(UnsoldTaskIDs) = TimeToReAuctionTasks +
(0:length(UnsoldTaskIDs)-1).*AuctionTimeStep; % For initial undelivered
tasks
while(1) % do until all tasks are re-auctioned
CycleCount = CycleCount + 1;
NumberOfTask(CycleCount) = length(UnsoldTaskIDs);
UnsoldTaskIDsTemp = [];
for i = 1: NumberOfTask(CycleCount)
TaskID = UnsoldTaskIDs(i);
NewTask_id = TaskID;
Start_t = Start_t + AuctionTimeStep; % note, Start_t
starts from TimeToReAuctionTasks and it is basically task re-auctioned
time
TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID) = Start_t; %
AllTaskDeadlines(TaskID,:) = AllTaskDeadlines(TaskID) +
Start_t - max(UAV_Elimination_Time, TimeHistory(ROUTEidToDelete,1));
% task deadlines have been readjusted
NewTaskDeadline = AllTaskDeadlines(TaskID);
%Compute the cost of the task to be auctioned
t = TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID)-InitReAuctioneTimes(TaskID);
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TI_Po(:,TaskID) = 2*(norm(TI-Task(TaskID,:))*DistUnitCost +
norm(TI-Task(TaskID,:))*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed); % initial price from
the task initiator
TI_TaskCost(TaskID,:) = TI_CostScalar*TI_Po(:,TaskID)*(1 +
Up*t/tH_Robust(TaskID));
GS_Bids{TaskID} = GS_Bidding(NumberOfGS, TI,
Task(TaskID,:),GS_Cord,TI_CommRange,GS_CommRange,UAV_Speed,DistUnitCost
,TimeUnitCost,TI_TaskCost,TaskID); % sell bids
% Computing the UAVs Biddings and the optimize path as well
UAVwinnerBids = zeros(1,NumberOfGS);
WinnerUAVnames = zeros(1,NumberOfGS);
GSs_UAVs_BidPairs = zeros(NumberOfGS,4);
GSnames = 1:NumberOfGS;
AllUAVNames = 1: NumberOfUAVsAll; % initialization
if UAVRecoveryTime < Start_t
for gs = 1:NumberOfGS
UAV_Bids{TaskID}(UAV_ID_Eliminate) = inf;
GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAV_ID_Eliminate} = [];
GS(gs).PathTime(UAV_ID_Eliminate,:) = inf;
end
AllUAVNames(UAV_ID_Eliminate)=[]; % to prevent the
deleted UAV from bidding
end
for gs = 1:NumberOfGS
UAV_Bid = [];
for j=1: length(AllUAVNames) %NumberOfUAVsAll
UAVID = AllUAVNames(j);
%
if UAVID==UAV_ID_Eliminate && UAVRecoveryTime <
Start_t
%
UAV_Bids{TaskID}(UAVID) = inf;
GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID} = []; GS(gs).PathTime(UAVID,:) = inf; % to
prevent the deleted UAV from bidding
%
else
if isempty(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVID})
UAV_TaskListPrevious = [];
NewLeastPathTime = 0;
OldTaskDeadline = 0;
oldGS_ID = 0;
[UAV_Bids{TaskID}(UAVID),GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID},GS(gs).PathTime(UAVID)
] = UAV_Bidding(UAV_TaskListPrevious, TI,
TI_id,UAVID,UAVs_CurrentLocations,Task,UAV_Speed,TI_TaskCost,...
TaskID,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,...
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OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange,
TaskAuctionTimes,GS_Cord,gs,oldGS_ID);
elseif ~isempty(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVID})
UAV_TaskListPrevious =
UAV_TaskListNew{UAVID};
NewLeastPathTime = WinnerPathTime(UAVID);
%
OldTaskDeadline =
DeadTimes(UAVID);
oldGS_ID = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVID}(end);
%
bb = GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID}(end-1)
OldTaskDeadline =
min(AllTaskDeadlines(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVID}));
%AllTaskDeadlines(GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID}(end-1));
[UAV_Bids{TaskID}(UAVID),GS(gs).UAV_Route{UAVID},GS(gs).PathTime(UAVID)
] = UAV_Bidding(UAV_TaskListPrevious, TI,
TI_id,UAVID,UAVs_CurrentLocations,Task,UAV_Speed,TI_TaskCost,...
TaskID,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,...
OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange,
TaskAuctionTimes,GS_Cord,gs,oldGS_ID);
end
%

end
end
[UAVwinnerBids(gs), WinnerUAVnames(gs)] =
min(UAV_Bids{TaskID});
end
GSs_UAVs_BidPairs = [GSnames',round(GS_Bids{TaskID}'),
WinnerUAVnames',round(UAVwinnerBids')];
disp('GSs and UAVs bid pairs:')
disp('
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
UAV_Bid')
disp(GSs_UAVs_BidPairs)
%
UAV_Bids{i}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Matching the GS_Bids (i.e. sell bids) and the UAV_Bids
(i.e. buy
% bids
Sell_in_Bids = [];
Buy_in_Bids = [];
TransactionSet = [];
UAV_Indx = [];
GS_Indx = [];
UAV_Indx1 = [];
GS_Indx1 = [];
% Determine eligible sellers and buyers
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for m=1:NumberOfGS
if GS_Bids{TaskID}(m)~=Inf && UAVwinnerBids(m)~=Inf
TransactionSet = [TransactionSet;
[GS_Bids{TaskID}(m),UAVwinnerBids(m)]];
UAV_Indx1 = [UAV_Indx1; WinnerUAVnames(m)];
GS_Indx1 = [GS_Indx1; m];
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NumOfSellers = size(TransactionSet,1);
if ~isempty(TransactionSet) % There are seller(s) and
buyer(s)
[ignore1 OrigIndx] = min(TransactionSet(:,1));
OriginalUAVtemp = UAV_Indx1(OrigIndx);
OriginalGStemp = GS_Indx1(OrigIndx);
Rank = sort([TransactionSet(:,1),
TransactionSet(:,2)],'ascend');
M_BuyBid(TaskID,:) = Rank(NumOfSellers); % Mth bid
M_nextBuyBid(TaskID,:) = Rank(NumOfSellers+1); % M+1st
bid
[Sell_Bids{TaskID}, GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}] =
min(TransactionSet(:,1));
GS_Indx(1) = GS_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % winner
GS(i.e. GS with minimum bid)
UAV_Indx(1) = UAV_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % winner
UAV (i.e. UAV with minimum bid)
Buy_Bids{TaskID} =
TransactionSet(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID},2);
%
GS_Winner =
GS_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % actual winner
GS_jUAV_SBids(TaskID) =
GS_Bids{TaskID}(GS_Indx(1)); % cost of GS to which task is delivered
%
GS_TaskDelivered(TaskID) = GS_Indx(1);
%%%Determine the winner
UAV_TaskListNew{UAV_Indx(1)}
=
[UAV_TaskListNew{UAV_Indx(1)}, TaskID];
GS_UAVList{GS_Indx(1)}
= [GS_UAVList{GS_Indx(1)},
UAV_Indx(1)];
WinnerUAV_Route{UAV_Indx(1)} =
GS(GS_Indx(1)).UAV_Route{UAV_Indx(1)};
WinnerPathTime(UAV_Indx(1)) =
GS(GS_Indx(1)).PathTime(UAV_Indx(1));
SellAndBuyBids(TaskID,:)
=
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:); %winning sell and buy bids pair
SellAndBuyWinners(TaskID,:) = [GS_Indx(1),
UAV_Indx(1)]; % UAVs and GSs that win the tasks
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:) = [Sell_Bids{TaskID},
Buy_Bids{TaskID}];
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SellAndBuyBids(TaskID,:) =
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:);
OriginalUAV(TaskID) = OriginalUAVtemp; % UAV with
minimum cost
OriginalGS(TaskID) = OriginalGStemp; % GS paired with
UAV with minimu cost
else % there are no sellers and/or buyers
UnsoldTaskIDsTemp = [UnsoldTaskIDsTemp,TaskID];
end
end
TransactionSet = [];

%

% Check if all tasks are sold
if isempty(UnsoldTaskIDsTemp)
break; % break from the while loop
else
UnsoldTaskIDs = UnsoldTaskIDsTemp; % tasks unsolds
end
UnsoldTaskIDs

end
ReauctionCloseTime = Start_t; % time at which the reauction of
the tasks from the disconnected UAV is over
end

%Display the final routes for UAVs which won some reauctioned tasks
UAVTasksStartTimes = [];
% disp('THE ROUTES FOR THE BUSY (THOSE WHICH HAD TASKS) UAVs FROM THE
TIME THE UNDELIVERED TASKS ARE REAUCTIONED:')
% for i=1: NumberOfUAVsAll
%
if ~isempty(WinnerUAV_Route{i})
%
%
UAVTasksStartTimes = [UAVTasksStartTimes;
GSTaskAuctionedTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{i}(2))];
%
disp(WinnerUAV_Route{i})
%
disp(sprintf('Tasks begin at %s, delivered at %s',
num2str(TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{i}(2))),...
%
num2str(round(WinnerPathTime(i)+
TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{i}(2))))))
%
disp(sprintf('\n'))
%
end
% end
TaskAuctionTimesOld(TasksUnDelivered) =
TaskAuctionTimes(TasksUnDelivered); % Replace the aution times for the
re-autioned tasks
%%% Detail Results
TaskNames = 1:InitNumberOfTask;
% Calculate the profit using the clearing price (i.e. M_BuyBid)
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SellerProfit1 = 0.5*(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2) + TI_TaskCost - SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1) -(
GS_jUAV_SBids-SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)));
BuyerProfit1 = SellerProfit1;
OriginalGS_Profit = 0.5*(GS_jUAV_SBids - SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)); %
profit of original GS that was paired with the winner UAV
AvgSellBid = mean(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1));
AvgBuyBid = mean(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2));
% AvgGS_DelivererBid = mean(GS_jUAV_SBids);
AvgOriginalGS_Bid = mean(GS_jUAV_SBids);
AllAvgBids = [AvgOriginalGS_Bid,AvgSellBid,AvgBuyBid];
AvgClearingPrice = mean(M_BuyBid);
AvgOriginalGS_Profit = mean(OriginalGS_Profit);
AvgSellProfit = mean(SellerProfit1);
AvgBuyProfit = mean(BuyerProfit1);
% AvgGS_DelivererProfit = mean(GS_Profit);
AllAvgProfits = [AvgClearingPrice,AvgOriginalGS_Profit,AvgSellProfit,
AvgBuyProfit];

% Compute the total profits for all GS
GS_TotalProfits = zeros(NumberOfGS,1);
GS_Names = 1:NumberOfGS;
for g = 1:NumberOfGS
GS_Originalfrequency = find(OriginalGS==g); % how often GS
originally paired with the winner UAV
GS_Sellfrequency = find(SellAndBuyWinners(:,1)==g); % how often GS
got tasks delivered to it
if ~isempty(GS_Originalfrequency)
GS_TotalProfits(g) = GS_TotalProfits(g)+
sum(OriginalGS_Profit(GS_Originalfrequency));
end
if ~isempty(GS_Sellfrequency)
GS_TotalProfits(g) = GS_TotalProfits(g)+
sum(SellerProfit1(GS_Sellfrequency));
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Compute the total for all UAVs
UAV_TotalProfits = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1);
UAV_Names = 1:NumberOfUAVs;
for u = 1:NumberOfUAVs
UAV_Buyfrequency = find(SellAndBuyWinners(:,2)==u); % how often UAV
buys tasks from Winner GS
if ~isempty(UAV_Buyfrequency)
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UAV_TotalProfits(u) = UAV_TotalProfits(u)+
sum(BuyerProfit1(UAV_Buyfrequency));
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Write the results into excel sheeet
TITLE = {'TaskName','Creation Time(sec)','Auction
Time(sec)','Deadline(sec)','Task Cost($) (from TI)', 'Original Seller
Bid($)','Winning Seller Bid($)', 'Winning Buyer Bid($)',...
'Original_GS', 'Seller(GS)','Buyer(UAV)', 'Clearing Price($)',
'Original_GS Profit($)', 'Seller Profit($)','Buyer Profit($)'};
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
TITLE, 'A1:O1')
BuySellRecords = [TaskNames',TaskCreationTime',TaskAuctionTimesOld,
AllTaskDeadlines,TI_TaskCost,GS_jUAV_SBids,SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1),Se
llAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2),...
OriginalGS, SellAndBuyWinners(:,1), SellAndBuyWinners(:,2),M_BuyBid,
OriginalGS_Profit,SellerProfit1,BuyerProfit1];
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
BuySellRecords, strcat('A2:O',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+1)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
{'AVERAGE'},
strcat('E',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+2),':','E',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+2)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
AllAvgBids,
strcat('F',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+2),':','H',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+2)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
AllAvgProfits,
strcat('L',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+2),':','O',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+2)))
SubTitle = {'GS', 'GS Total Profit($)'};
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
SubTitle,
strcat('I',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+5),':','J',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+5)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
GS_Names',
strcat('I',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+6),':','I',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+6+NumberOfGS-1)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
GS_TotalProfits,
strcat('J',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+6),':','J',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+6+NumberOfGS-1)))

SubTitle = {'UAV', 'UAV Total Profit($)'};
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
SubTitle,
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strcat('M',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+5),':','N',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+5)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
UAV_Names',
strcat('M',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+6),':','M',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+6+NumberOfUAVs-1)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Robust_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
UAV_TotalProfits,
strcat('N',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+6),':','N',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+6+NumberOfUAVs-1)))
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

%Display the UAV tasklists
% TimeHistory = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,4); %initialization
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization
GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization to hold
coordinates without UAV current locations
UAVTasksCompletionDurations = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1);
GS_UAVRoutesAll{NumberOfUAVs} = [];
TaskCompletionTimes = [];
TaskCompletionDists = [];
WinnerUAV_RouteNew = WinnerUAV_Route;
UAV_TaskList{NumberOfUAVsAll} = []; % initialization
WinnerUAV_Route{NumberOfUAVsAll} = [];
GS = 0;
DelayTimes = zeros(1,NumberOfUAVsAll);
DelayTimes(UAV_ID_Eliminate) = UAVRecoveryTime-UAV_Elimination_Time;
disp('RECORDS FOR UAVs WHICH WON REAUCTIONED TASK(S): ')
disp('(Note: Those UAVs which did not win any reacuctioned tasks have
the same records as shown before)')
for UAVname=1:NumberOfUAVsAll
UAV_TaskList{UAVname} = [UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname},
UAV_TaskListNew{UAVname}];
if ~isempty(WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname})
GS = WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}(end);
elseif ~isempty(WinnerUAV_RouteOld{UAVname})
GS = WinnerUAV_RouteOld{UAVname}(end);
end
if ~isempty(UAV_TaskList{UAVname})&&
~isempty(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVname})
WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname} = [UAVname,
UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname},WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}(2:end1),GS]; % from beginning to end
disp(strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVname),':'))
disp('TASKLIST:'),
disp('Task completed before REAUCTION:')
disp(UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname})
disp('Task completed after REAUCTION:')
disp(UAV_TaskListNew{UAVname})
disp('Minimum Route from start to end:'),
disp(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}) % from start to after reauction
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disp('StartTime

DeliveryTime

PathTime LatestDeliveryTime')

DeliveryTime = round(ReauctionCloseTime) +
round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname));
%
DeliveryTime = round(CycleAuctionCloseTime)+
round(WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname))+ round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname));
LatestDeliveryTime =
min(AllTaskDeadlines(UAV_TaskList{UAVname}));
UAVPathTime = round(WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname))+
round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname)); % time taken by UAV from start to end
TimeHistory(UAVname,:) =
round([CycleAuctionCloseTime(end),DeliveryTime, UAVPathTime,
LatestDeliveryTime]);
%
%
DeliveryTime =
round(TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2)))+
max(round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname)), round(WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname)))+
DelayTimes(UAVname);
%
LatestDeliveryTime =
min(AllTaskDeadlines(UAV_TaskList{UAVname}));
%
UAVPathTime = DeliveryTime round(TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2)))DelayTimes(UAVname);
%
TimeHistory(UAVname,:) =
round([TaskAuctionTimes(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2)),DeliveryTime,
UAVPathTime, LatestDeliveryTime]);
%
disp(TimeHistory(UAVname,:))
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname} =
[UAVs(UAVname,:);Task(UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname},:);
UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAVname,:);...
Task(WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}(2:end-1),:);GS_Cord(GS,:)];
GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{UAVname} =
[UAVs(UAVname,:);Task(UAV_TaskListCompleted{UAVname},:);...
Task(WinnerUAV_RouteNew{UAVname}(2:end-1),:);GS_Cord(GS,:)];
TaskNames = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2:end-1);
UAVTasksCompletionDurations(UAVname) = WinnerPathTime(UAVname);
GS_UAVRoutesAll{UAVname} = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname};
TaskCompletionTimes = [TaskCompletionTimes,
WinnerPathTime(UAVname) + WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname)];
figure('Name', strcat('Robustness: Path for executing task by
UAV', num2str(UAVname)))
plot3(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,2)
,GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,3),'*-')
text(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,2),
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,3), strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVname)))
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text(GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{UAVname}(2:end1,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{UAVname}(2:end1,2),GS_UAVRouteCordAllTemp{UAVname}(2:end-1,3), num2str(TaskNames'))
text(UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAVname,1),UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAVname,2),
UAVs_CurrentLocations(UAVname,3), strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVname)))
text(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end
,2),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end,3), strcat('GS',num2str(GS)))
grid on
xlabel('x')
ylabel('y')
zlabel('z')
else
TaskCompletionTimes = [TaskCompletionTimes,
WinnerPathTime(UAVname) + WinnerPathTimeOld(UAVname)];
end
end
TaskCompletionDists = UAV_Speed.*TaskCompletionTimes;
% Display the GS and the UAVs it solds tasks to
for GS=1:NumberOfGS
if ~isempty(GS_UAVList{GS})
disp(strcat('UAV LIST FOR GS',num2str(GS),':'))
disp(GS_UAVList{GS})
end
end
disp('
AvgDist(m)
AvgTime(s) Dist_std(m) Time_std(s)')
disp(round([mean(TaskCompletionDists), mean(TaskCompletionTimes),
std(TaskCompletionDists), std(TaskCompletionTimes)]))
% plot the space just before negotiation
% UAVs_CurrentLocations
PlotTheSpaceWithTheAgents(GS_Cord, GS_CommRange,
NumberOfGS,TI_CommRange, TI,UAVs_CurrentLocations,NumberOfUAVsAll)

File
function [UAV_Bid,UAV_Route,PathTime] = RouteOptimizer(UAV_TaskList,
GS_Cord, GS_id, UAV_id, UAVs, Task,UAV_Speed,Task_Cost,...
NewTask_id,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,.
..
OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange,TASK_auctionTime,
GSTaskAuctionedTimes, GS_WinningCosts)
global GS_UAVCommStrength
UAV_Bid = [];
UAV_Route =[];
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PathTime = [];
if ~isempty(UAV_TaskList)
PreviousLeastPathTime = NewLeastPathTime;
Task_Order = perms([UAV_TaskList,NewTask_id]);
[NumOfPath,NumOfCordPerPath] = size(Task_Order);
UAV_Path = [repmat(UAV_id,NumOfPath,1),
Task_Order,repmat(GS_id,NumOfPath,1)];
NumOfCordPerPath = NumOfCordPerPath + 2;
Path_Cost = [];
for m = 1:NumOfPath
Path_Dist(m,:)= 0;
UAV_Path_Cord = [UAVs(UAV_id,:); Task(Task_Order(m,:),:);
GS_Cord(GS_id,:)];
for n = 1:NumOfCordPerPath-1
Path_Dist(m,:) = Path_Dist(m,:) +
norm(UAV_Path_Cord(n+1,:)-UAV_Path_Cord(n,:));
end
end
Path_Dist = Path_Dist GS_UAVCommStrength*(GS_CommRange+UAV_CommRange);
Path_Cost = Path_Dist*DistUnitCost; % in USD
PathTime = Path_Dist./UAV_Speed; % (in seconds)
PathTime_Cost = PathTime *TimeUnitCost; % in USD
[Path_LeastCost,Path_Idx] = min(Path_Cost + PathTime_Cost);
UAV_Route = UAV_Path(Path_Idx,:);
NewLeastPathTime = PathTime(Path_Idx,:);
PathTime = NewLeastPathTime;
FirstTaskAuctionTime = GSTaskAuctionedTimes(UAV_Route(2)); % the
time at which the first task in that UAV task list is auctioned
UAV_BidCost = UAV_BidChecker(NewLeastPathTime,
Task_Cost,PreviousLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,
FirstTaskAuctionTime,...
OldTaskDeadline,DistUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeUnitCost);
UAV_Bid = UAV_BidCost;
elseif isempty(UAV_TaskList)
[UAV_Bid,PathTime] = UAV_LocalBid(GS_Cord,UAVs,GS_id,
NewTask_id,Task,UAV_id,DistUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeUnitCost,GS_CommRange
,UAV_CommRange,NewTaskDeadline,TASK_auctionTime,GS_WinningCosts);
UAV_Route = [UAV_id,NewTask_id,GS_id];
end

File
function [UAV_BidCost,PathTime] = UAV_BidChecker(NewLeastPathTime,
Task_Cost,PreviousLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,FirstTaskAuctionTime,Ol
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dTaskDeadline,DistUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeUnitCost,NewTask_id,PathTime1.
..
,GS_Cord,GS_ID,UAV_id, UAVs,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange)
UAV_ExtraTime = NewLeastPathTime - PreviousLeastPathTime;
NewLeastPathDueTime = NewLeastPathTime+FirstTaskAuctionTime; % Expected
time for UAV to deliver its tasks
ExtraDistCost = UAV_ExtraTime*UAV_Speed*DistUnitCost;
ExtraTimeCost = UAV_ExtraTime*TimeUnitCost;
UAV_CostCheck = ExtraDistCost + ExtraTimeCost;
UAVCommCheck = norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)- GS_Cord(GS_ID,:)); % checking to
see if UAV and GS are in communication range
if (NewTaskDeadline<=OldTaskDeadline) &&(NewLeastPathDueTime<=
NewTaskDeadline)&& (UAV_CostCheck<=Task_Cost(NewTask_id)) &&
UAVCommCheck <=(GS_CommRange + UAV_CommRange)
% if (NewLeastPathDueTime<= OldTaskDeadline)&&(NewTaskDeadline<=
OldTaskDeadline)&&(UAV_CostCheck>=Task_Cost(NewTask_id))
UAV_BidCost = UAV_CostCheck;
PathTime = PathTime1;
else
UAV_BidCost = Inf;
PathTime = Inf;
end
% [(NewTaskDeadline-OldTaskDeadline),(NewLeastPathDueTimeNewTaskDeadline), (UAV_CostCheck-Task_Cost(NewTask_id)), (UAVCommCheck
-(GS_CommRange + UAV_CommRange))]

File
function [UAV_BidCost,PathTime] = UAV_BidChecker(NewLeastPathTime,
Task_Cost,PreviousLeastPathTime,NewTaskDeadline,FirstTaskAuctionTime,Ol
dTaskDeadline,DistUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeUnitCost,NewTask_id,PathTime1.
..
,GS_Cord,GS_ID,UAV_id, UAVs,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange)
UAV_ExtraTime = NewLeastPathTime - PreviousLeastPathTime;
NewLeastPathDueTime = NewLeastPathTime+FirstTaskAuctionTime; % Expected
time for UAV to deliver its tasks
ExtraDistCost = UAV_ExtraTime*UAV_Speed*DistUnitCost;
ExtraTimeCost = UAV_ExtraTime*TimeUnitCost;
UAV_CostCheck = ExtraDistCost + ExtraTimeCost;
UAVCommCheck = norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)- GS_Cord(GS_ID,:)); % checking to
see if UAV and GS are in communication range
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if (NewTaskDeadline<=OldTaskDeadline) &&(NewLeastPathDueTime<=
NewTaskDeadline)&& (UAV_CostCheck<=Task_Cost(NewTask_id)) &&
UAVCommCheck <=(GS_CommRange + UAV_CommRange)
% if (NewLeastPathDueTime<= OldTaskDeadline)&&(NewTaskDeadline<=
OldTaskDeadline)&&(UAV_CostCheck>=Task_Cost(NewTask_id))
UAV_BidCost = UAV_CostCheck;
PathTime = PathTime1;
else
UAV_BidCost = Inf;
PathTime = Inf;
end
% [(NewTaskDeadline-OldTaskDeadline),(NewLeastPathDueTimeNewTaskDeadline), (UAV_CostCheck-Task_Cost(NewTask_id)), (UAVCommCheck
-(GS_CommRange + UAV_CommRange))]

File
function [UAV_Cost,PathTime] = UAV_LocalBid(TI,UAVs,TI_id,
Task_id,Task,UAV_id,DistUnitCost,UAV_Speed,...
TimeUnitCost,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange,NewTaskDeadline,TASK_auctionTim
es, Task_Cost,GS_Cord,GS_ID)
% This function computes the bid for UAV that communicates with a given
GS
% having a task list
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
global GS_UAVCommStrength
UAV_Cost = [];
PathTime = [];
Alpha = 0.5;
%
UAVCommCheck = norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)- GS_Cord(GS_ID,:)); % checking to
see if UAV and GS are in communication range
if UAVCommCheck <=(GS_CommRange + UAV_CommRange)
%
Dist = (norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)-Task(Task_id,:)) +
norm(Task(Task_id,:)-GS_Cord(GS_ID,:)))-(1GS_UAVCommStrength)*(GS_CommRange+UAV_CommRange);
%

Dist = 2*norm(UAVs(UAV_id,:)-Task(Task_id,:));
DistCost = Dist*DistUnitCost;
Time = Dist/UAV_Speed;
TimeCost = Time*TimeUnitCost;
Cost = DistCost + TimeCost; % measured in USD
if Time<=(NewTaskDeadline-TASK_auctionTimes(Task_id))&&
Cost<=Task_Cost(Task_id)
%
UAV_Cost = Alpha*Task_Cost(Task_id) + Cost*(1-Alpha); % the
bid from UAV for a task
PathTime = Time;
UAV_Cost = Cost;
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else
UAV_Cost = Inf;
PathTime = Inf;
end
else

%
end

UAV_Cost =
PathTime =
UAV_id

Inf;
Inf;

File
clear all;
close all;
clc;
global Task UAVsAll GS_Cord GS_CommRange NumberOfGS TI_CommRange TI
UAV_CommRange UAV_Speed WinnerUAV_RouteOld TangGS_CommRange
GS_UAVCommStrength...
DistUnitCost TimeUnitCost NumberOfUAVs GSTaskAuctionedTimes Up
AuctionTimeStep TI_id TaskAuctionTimesOld WinnerPathTimeOld GS_UAVList
UAVs
global SellAndBuyBids M_BuyBid SellAndBuyWinners SellAndBuyWinnerBids
TI_TaskCost GS_jUAV_SBids InitNumberOfTask TaskCreationTime Scenario
global TI_CostScalar CycleAuctionCloseTime Gamma OriginalUAV OriginalGS
% load tasks from file
load('RandTasks_12')
Task = RandTasks; % Don't edit this line
% Task = load ('-ascii', 'TaskCord.DAT'); %// old
% %load randomized UAVs
% load('RandUAVs'); % 10 set of initial UAVs location
% SampleNumber = 1; % Choose from 1 through 10
% UAVs = RandUAVs{SampleNumber};
TangGS_CommRange = 200; % radius when GSs are tangent to each other
UAV_CommRange = 250;%750; %2500; %150; %2500; % 150, 250,750,1000,1500
UAV_CommRangeMin = 250;
Scenario = 2;
% 1 =>GSs Disjoint, 2 => GSs Overlapped, 3 => GSs at
Tangency
NumberOfUAVs = 9;
UAV_Speed = 10; % in m/s
GS_UAVCommStrength = 0.1; % comm strength between GS and UAV. The
bigger this number the weaker the communication
GS_GS_CommStrength = 1; % comm strength between two GSs if they
intersect
% Note: (1)The bigger the communication radius, the stronger the
% communication. (2) This value lies between 0 and 1
Gamma = 0.002; % Note: Gamma is a fraction of latest delivery time of
task by eliminated UAV
% Cost constant
DistUnitCost = 0.1;
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TimeUnitCost = 0.1;
Up = 1;
InitNumberOfTask = size(Task,1);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Initiator's Coordinates
X_TI = 0;
Y_TI = 0;
Z_TI = 0;
TI = [X_TI, Y_TI, Z_TI];
TI_id = 1; % There is only one Task initiator
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

% Generate the Ground Stations (GS)
NumberOfGS = 3;
[GS_Cord, GS_CommRange,TI_CommRange] = CreateGroundStations(NumberOfGS,
TI,TangGS_CommRange,Scenario, GS_GS_CommStrength);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(sprintf('Actual GS communication radius for the overlap case is:
%s', num2str(GS_CommRange)))
disp(sprintf('TI communication radius: %s',
num2str(round(TI_CommRange))))
disp(sprintf('\n')) % print an empty space for clarity purposes
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Generate Randomized the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such that each
communicate
% with at least two GS
% RandUAVs =
GenerateRandUAVs(NumberOfGS,NumberOfUAVs,GS_Cord,TangGS_CommRange,UAV_C
ommRangeMin);
% Note: comment the line above once you're satisfied with the initial
randomized locations of the UAVs
load(strcat(num2str(NumberOfUAVs),'RandUAVs_',num2str(UAV_CommRangeMin)
)) % don't edit this line
UAVs = RandUAVs; % Don't edit this line
%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

UAV_TaskList{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization
GS_UAVList{NumberOfGS} = []; % initialization
SellAndBuyBids = [];
SellAndBuyBidsLimit = [];
TaskAuctionTimes = [];
tH = [];
AuctionTimeStep = 2; %in seconds
DeadLineScalar = 10; % To give good estimation of the task's deadline
TI_CostScalar = 1; % To give good estimation of the task's cost

119

TaskCreationTime = 0:AuctionTimeStep:(InitNumberOfTask1)*AuctionTimeStep; % Task is created every 2 seconds
UnsoldTaskIDs = 1:InitNumberOfTask; % all tasks are unsold initially
CycleCount = 0;
SellAndBuyBids = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,2);% initialization for winning
sell and buy bids pair
GS_jUAV_SBids = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); % initialization
M_BuyBid = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); % initialization
SellAndBuyWinners = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,2); % initialization
SellAndBuyWinnerBids = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,2); % initialization
GS_TaskDelivered = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1); % initialization
WinnerUAV_Route{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization
WinnerPathTime = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1); % initialization
OriginalUAV = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1);
OriginalGS = zeros(InitNumberOfTask,1);
tH_Original = DeadLineScalar*(sqrt(sum((bsxfun(@minus, TI,
Task)).^2,2)))/UAV_Speed;% all original task deadlines
while(1)
CycleCount = CycleCount + 1;
NumberOfTask(CycleCount) = length(UnsoldTaskIDs);
UnsoldTaskIDsTemp = [];
CycleAuctionCloseTime(CycleCount) = sum(NumberOfTask 1)*AuctionTimeStep;
for i=1:NumberOfTask(CycleCount)
TaskID = UnsoldTaskIDs(i);
if CycleCount>1
TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID) = i*AuctionTimeStep +
CycleAuctionCloseTime(CycleCount-1);
else
TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID,:) = TaskCreationTime(TaskID);
end
t = TaskAuctionTimes(TaskID) - TaskCreationTime(TaskID); % Time
ellasped before task gets sold
tH(TaskID,:) = tH_Original(TaskID) + t; % Task deadline
%Compute the cost of the task to be auctioned
TI_Po(:,TaskID) = 2*(norm(TI-Task(TaskID,:))*DistUnitCost +
norm(TI-Task(TaskID,:))*TimeUnitCost/UAV_Speed); % initial price from
the task initiator
TI_TaskCost(TaskID,:) = TI_CostScalar*TI_Po(:,TaskID)*(1 +
Up*t/tH_Original(TaskID));
GS_Bids{TaskID} = GS_Bidding(NumberOfGS, TI,
Task(TaskID,:),GS_Cord,TI_CommRange,GS_CommRange,UAV_Speed,DistUnitCost
,TimeUnitCost,TI_TaskCost,TaskID); % sell bids

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Compute the bids for the UAVs
UAVwinnerBids = zeros(1,NumberOfGS);
WinnerUAVnames = zeros(1,NumberOfGS);
GSs_UAVs_BidPairs = zeros(NumberOfGS,4);
GSnames = 1:NumberOfGS;
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for gs = 1:NumberOfGS
UAV_BidsTemp = Inf*ones(1,NumberOfUAVs); % initialization
for k=1:NumberOfUAVs
if isempty(UAV_TaskList{k})
UAV_TaskListPrevious = [];
NewLeastPathTime = 0;
OldTaskDeadline = 0;
oldGS_ID = 0;
[UAV_Bids{TaskID}(k),GS(gs).UAV_Route{k},GS(gs).PathTime(k)] =
UAV_Bidding(UAV_TaskListPrevious, TI, TI_id, k, UAVs,
Task,UAV_Speed,TI_TaskCost,...
TaskID,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,tH(TaskID),...
OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange,
TaskAuctionTimes,GS_Cord,gs,oldGS_ID);
else
UAV_TaskListPrevious = UAV_TaskList{k};
NewLeastPathTime = WinnerPathTime(k,:);
OldTaskDeadline = min(tH(UAV_TaskList{k}));
%tH(GS(gs).UAV_Route{k}(end-1));
oldGS_ID = WinnerUAV_Route{k}(end);
[UAV_Bids{TaskID}(k),GS(gs).UAV_Route{k},GS(gs).PathTime(k)] =
UAV_Bidding(UAV_TaskListPrevious, TI, TI_id, k, UAVs,
Task,UAV_Speed,TI_TaskCost,...
TaskID,DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,NewLeastPathTime,tH(TaskID),...
OldTaskDeadline,GS_CommRange,UAV_CommRange,
TaskAuctionTimes,GS_Cord,gs,oldGS_ID);
end
end
%
UAV_Bids{TaskID}
[UAVwinnerBids(gs), WinnerUAVnames(gs)] =
min(UAV_Bids{TaskID});
UAV_BidsTemp(WinnerUAVnames(gs)) = UAVwinnerBids(gs);
end
GSs_UAVs_BidPairs = [GSnames',round(GS_Bids{TaskID}'),
WinnerUAVnames',round(UAVwinnerBids')];
disp('GSs and UAVs bid pairs:')
disp('
GS
GS_Bid
UAV
UAV_Bid')
disp(GSs_UAVs_BidPairs)
%
UAV_Bids{i}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Matching the GS_Bids (i.e. sell bids) and the UAV_Bids (i.e. buy
% bids
Sell_in_Bids = [];
Buy_in_Bids = [];
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TransactionSet = [];
UAV_Indx = [];
GS_Indx = [];
UAV_Indx1 = [];
GS_Indx1 = [];
% Determine eligible sellers and buyers
for m=1:NumberOfGS
if GS_Bids{TaskID}(m)~=Inf && UAVwinnerBids(m)~=Inf
TransactionSet = [TransactionSet;
[GS_Bids{TaskID}(m),UAVwinnerBids(m)]];
UAV_Indx1 = [UAV_Indx1; WinnerUAVnames(m)];
GS_Indx1 = [GS_Indx1; m];
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NumOfSellers = size(TransactionSet,1);
if ~isempty(TransactionSet) % There are seller(s) and buyer(s)
[ignore1 OrigIndx] = min(TransactionSet(:,1));
OriginalUAVtemp = UAV_Indx1(OrigIndx);
OriginalGStemp = GS_Indx1(OrigIndx);
Rank = sort([TransactionSet(:,1),
TransactionSet(:,2)],'ascend');
M_BuyBid(TaskID,:) = Rank(NumOfSellers); % Mth bid
M_nextBuyBid(TaskID,:) = Rank(NumOfSellers+1); % M+1st bid
[Sell_Bids{TaskID}, GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}] =
min(TransactionSet(:,1));
GS_Indx(1) = GS_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % winner GS(i.e.
GS with minimum bid)
UAV_Indx(1) = UAV_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % winner UAV
(i.e. UAV with minimum bid)
Buy_Bids{TaskID} = TransactionSet(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID},2);
GS_Winner = GS_Indx1(GS_IndxTemp{TaskID}); % actual winner
GS_jUAV_SBids(TaskID) = GS_Bids{TaskID}(GS_Indx(1)); % cost of
GS to which task is supposed to be delivered
GS_TaskDelivered(TaskID) = GS_Indx(1);
%

%%%Determine the winner
UAV_TaskList{UAV_Indx(1)}

= [UAV_TaskList{UAV_Indx(1)},

TaskID];
GS_UAVList{GS_Indx(1)}
= [GS_UAVList{GS_Indx(1)},
UAV_Indx(1)];
WinnerUAV_Route{UAV_Indx(1)} =
GS(GS_Indx(1)).UAV_Route{UAV_Indx(1)};
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WinnerPathTime(UAV_Indx(1)) =
GS(GS_Indx(1)).PathTime(UAV_Indx(1));
SellAndBuyBids(TaskID,:)
=
%winning sell and buy bids pair
SellAndBuyWinners(TaskID,:) =
UAVs and GSs that win the tasks
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:)
Buy_Bids{TaskID}];
SellAndBuyBids(TaskID,:) =

SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:);
[GS_Indx(1), UAV_Indx(1)]; %
= [Sell_Bids{TaskID},
SellAndBuyWinnerBids(TaskID,:);

OriginalUAV(TaskID) = OriginalUAVtemp; % UAV with minimum cost
OriginalGS(TaskID) = OriginalGStemp; % GS paired with UAV
with minimu cost
else % there are no sellers and/or buyers
UnsoldTaskIDsTemp = [UnsoldTaskIDsTemp,TaskID];
end
end
TransactionSet = [];
% Check if all tasks are sold
if isempty(UnsoldTaskIDsTemp)
break; % break from the while loop
else
UnsoldTaskIDs = UnsoldTaskIDsTemp; % tasks unsolds
end
%
UnsoldTaskIDs
end
UAV_TaskList % without robustness
TaskAuctionTimesOld = TaskAuctionTimes;
WinnerPathTimeOld = WinnerPathTime;
WinnerUAV_RouteOld = WinnerUAV_Route;
TaskNames = 1:InitNumberOfTask;
% Calculate the profit using the clearing price (i.e. M_BuyBid)
SellerProfit1 = 0.5*(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2) + TI_TaskCost - SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1) -(
GS_jUAV_SBids-SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1))); % profit of GS to which task
is delivered to
BuyerProfit1
= SellerProfit1; %profit of the winner UAV
OriginalGS_Profit
= 0.5*(GS_jUAV_SBids SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1)); % profit of original GS that was paired
with the winner UAV
AvgSellBid = mean(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1));
AvgBuyBid = mean(SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2));
% AvgGS_DelivererBid = mean(GS_jUAV_SBids);
AvgOriginalGS_Bid = mean(GS_jUAV_SBids);
AllAvgBids = [AvgOriginalGS_Bid,AvgSellBid,AvgBuyBid];
AvgClearingPrice = mean(M_BuyBid);
AvgOriginalGS_Profit = mean(OriginalGS_Profit);
AvgSellProfit = mean(SellerProfit1);
AvgBuyProfit = mean(BuyerProfit1);
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% AvgGS_DelivererProfit = mean(GS_Profit);
AllAvgProfits = [AvgClearingPrice,AvgOriginalGS_Profit,AvgSellProfit,
AvgBuyProfit];

% Compute the total profits for all GS
GS_TotalProfits = zeros(NumberOfGS,1);
GS_Names = 1:NumberOfGS;
for g = 1:NumberOfGS
GS_Originalfrequency = find(OriginalGS==g); % how often GS
originally paired with the winner UAV
GS_Sellfrequency = find(SellAndBuyWinners(:,1)==g); % how often GS
got tasks delivered to it
if ~isempty(GS_Originalfrequency)
GS_TotalProfits(g) = GS_TotalProfits(g)+
sum(OriginalGS_Profit(GS_Originalfrequency));
end
if ~isempty(GS_Sellfrequency)
GS_TotalProfits(g) = GS_TotalProfits(g)+
sum(SellerProfit1(GS_Sellfrequency));
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

% Compute the total for all UAVs
UAV_TotalProfits = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1);
UAV_Names = 1:NumberOfUAVs;
for u = 1:NumberOfUAVs
UAV_Buyfrequency = find(SellAndBuyWinners(:,2)==u); % how often UAV
buys tasks from Winner GS
if ~isempty(UAV_Buyfrequency)
UAV_TotalProfits(u) = UAV_TotalProfits(u)+
sum(BuyerProfit1(UAV_Buyfrequency));
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

% Write the results into excel sheeet
TITLE = {'TaskName','Creation Time(sec)','Auction
Time(sec)','Deadline(sec)','Task Cost($) (from TI)', 'Original Seller
Bid($)','Winning Seller Bid($)', 'Winning Buyer Bid($)',...
'Original_GS', 'Seller(GS)','Buyer(UAV)', 'Clearing Price($)',
'Original_GS Profit($)', 'Seller Profit($)','Buyer Profit($)'};
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xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)), TITLE,
'A1:O1')
BuySellRecords =
[TaskNames',TaskCreationTime',TaskAuctionTimes,tH,TI_TaskCost
,GS_jUAV_SBids, SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,1),SellAndBuyWinnerBids(:,2),...
OriginalGS, SellAndBuyWinners(:,1), SellAndBuyWinners(:,2),M_BuyBid,
OriginalGS_Profit, SellerProfit1,BuyerProfit1];
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
BuySellRecords, strcat('A2:O',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+1)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
{'AVERAGE'},
strcat('E',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+2),':','E',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+2)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
AllAvgBids,
strcat('F',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+2),':','H',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+2)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
AllAvgProfits,
strcat('L',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+2),':','O',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+2)))
SubTitle = {'GS', 'GS Total Profit($)'};
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)), SubTitle,
strcat('I',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+5),':','J',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+5)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
GS_Names',
strcat('I',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+6),':','I',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+6+NumberOfGS-1)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
GS_TotalProfits,
strcat('J',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+6),':','J',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+6+NumberOfGS-1)))

SubTitle = {'UAV', 'UAV Total Profit($)'};
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)), SubTitle,
strcat('M',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+5),':','N',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+5)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
UAV_Names',
strcat('M',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+6),':','M',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+6+NumberOfUAVs-1)))
xlswrite(strcat('BuySellResults_Scenario',num2str(Scenario)),
UAV_TotalProfits,
strcat('N',num2str(InitNumberOfTask+6),':','N',num2str(InitNumberOfTask
+6+NumberOfUAVs-1)))
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp('Ground Stations coordinates (in rows):')
disp(round(GS_Cord))
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disp('UAVs Initial Coordinates (in rows):')
disp(round(UAVs))
disp('Tasks coordinates (in rows):')
disp(Task)
%Display the UAV tasklists
TimeHistory = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,4); %initialization
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{NumberOfUAVs} = []; % initialization
UAVTasksCompletionDurations = zeros(NumberOfUAVs,1);
GS_UAVRoutesAll{NumberOfUAVs} = [];
TaskCompletionTimes = zeros(1,NumberOfUAVs);
TaskCompletionDists = [];
for UAVname=1:NumberOfUAVs
if ~isempty(UAV_TaskList{UAVname})
disp(strcat('RECORDS FOR UAV',num2str(UAVname),':'))
disp('Tasklist:'), disp(UAV_TaskList{UAVname})
disp('Minimum Route:'), disp(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname})
disp('StartTime DeliveryTime PathTime LatestDeliveryTime')
DeliveryTime = round(CycleAuctionCloseTime(end))+
round(WinnerPathTime(UAVname));
LatestDeliveryTime = min(tH(UAV_TaskList{UAVname}));
TimeHistory(UAVname,:) =
round([CycleAuctionCloseTime(end),DeliveryTime,
WinnerPathTime(UAVname), LatestDeliveryTime]);
disp(TimeHistory(UAVname,:))
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname} =
[UAVs(UAVname,:);Task(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2:end-1),:);
GS_Cord(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(end),:)];
TaskNames = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(2:end-1);
UAVTasksCompletionDurations(UAVname) = WinnerPathTime(UAVname);
GS_UAVRoutesAll{UAVname} = WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname};
TaskCompletionTimes(UAVname) = WinnerPathTime(UAVname);
figure('Name', strcat('Path for executing task by UAV',
num2str(UAVname)))
plot3(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,2)
,GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(:,3),'*-')
text(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,2),
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(1,3), strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVname)))
text(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(2:end1,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(2:end1,2),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(2:end-1,3), num2str(TaskNames'))
text(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end,1),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end
,2),GS_UAVRouteCordAll{UAVname}(end,3),
strcat('GS',num2str(WinnerUAV_Route{UAVname}(end))))
grid on
xlabel('x')
ylabel('y')
zlabel('z')
end
end
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% WinnerPathTime(4)
TaskCompletionDists = UAV_Speed.*TaskCompletionTimes;
% Display the GS and the UAVs it solds tasks to
for GS=1:NumberOfGS
if ~isempty(GS_UAVList{GS})
disp(strcat('UAV LIST FOR GS',num2str(GS),':'))
disp(GS_UAVList{GS})
end
end
% TaskCompletionTimesNew = [TaskCompletionTimes,zeros(1, NumberOfUAVslength(TaskCompletionTimes))];
% TaskCompletionDists = UAV_Speed.*TaskCompletionTimesNew;
disp('
AvgDist(m)
AvgTime(s) Dist_std(m) Time_std(s)')
disp(round([mean(TaskCompletionDists), mean(TaskCompletionTimes),
std(TaskCompletionDists), std(TaskCompletionTimes)]))
% plot the space
PlotTheSpaceWithTheAgents(GS_Cord, GS_CommRange,
NumberOfGS,TI_CommRange, TI,UAVs,NumberOfUAVs)
%

% Running the robustness
% Inputs required from the user:
disp(sprintf('\n'))
disp(sprintf('\n'))
disp('RESULTS FROM THE ROBUSTNESS')
UAV_ID_Eliminate = 1;
UAV_Elimination_Time = 50;
UAVRecoveryTime = 4400;
Robustness(UAV_ID_Eliminate, UAV_Elimination_Time, UAVRecoveryTime,
GS_UAVRoutesAll,...
TimeHistory, GS_UAVRouteCordAll,TaskCompletionTimes,tH)

File
function [UAV_GSRoutesNeg,UAV_GSRoutesCordNeg]=
UAVNegotiator(GS_UAVRouteCordAll,GS_UAVRoutesAll,UAV_CommRange,...
UAV_Speed,TimeHistory,Deadlines,NegoTimeStep,DurationForNegotiation,Dis
tUnitCost,TimeUnitCost)
global TaskName
%%%%%%%% Computes the segmental lengths of the UAVs routes
[RouteLenghts,UAVCumRouteLenghts] =
ComputeSegmentDistance(GS_UAVRouteCordAll,GS_UAVRoutesAll);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NumberOfRoutes = length(GS_UAVRoutesAll);
for k =1:NegoTimeStep:DurationForNegotiation % first 3 seconds

127

for i=1:NumberOfRoutes
RoutesIDs = 1:NumberOfRoutes;
RoutesIDs(find(RoutesIDs==i))=[]; % avoid self-negotiation
UAVNegPath{i} = [];
PathCostNeg(i) = inf;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
DistTravel_UAVi = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed,
TimeHistory(i,1),k);
[UAVNewLocation(i,:),UAVi_MovingTo] =
FindUAVnewLocation(UAVCumRouteLenghts{i}, GS_UAVRouteCordAll{i},
RouteLenghts{i},DistTravel_UAVi);
UAVNegPath = []; PathCostNeg = [];
for kk=1:length(RoutesIDs)
j = RoutesIDs(kk);
UAVNegPath{j} = [];
DistTravel_UAVj = CalUAVDistance(UAV_Speed,
TimeHistory(kk,1),k);
[UAVNewLocation(j,:),UAVj_MovingTo, LastTaskDone] =
FindUAVnewLocation(UAVCumRouteLenghts{j}, GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j},
RouteLenghts{j},DistTravel_UAVj);
NegoCommCheck = norm(UAVNewLocation(i,:)-UAVNewLocation(j,:));
% UAVs new locations used
if (NegoCommCheck <= (UAV_CommRange
+UAV_CommRange))&&(length(RouteLenghts{i})>2&&
length(RouteLenghts{j})>2) % UAVs in comm range
%

disp('Communicate')
[UAVNegPath{j},PathCostNeg(j)] =
CalUAVsNegBids(DistTravel_UAVi,UAVi_MovingTo,...
UAVj_MovingTo,GS_UAVRouteCordAll{i},GS_UAVRouteCordAll{j},UAVNewLocatio
n(i,:),...
UAVNewLocation(j,:),DistUnitCost,TimeUnitCost,UAV_Speed,TimeHistory,j,D
eadlines,GS_UAVRoutesAll{i});
else
UAVNegPath{j} = [];
PathCostNeg(j) = inf;
end
end
%%%% Determine the winner from the negotiation
[ignore, NegWinner]= min(PathCostNeg);
if PathCostNeg~=inf
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{NegWinner} = UAVNegPath{NegWinner};
% winner route updated by adding a task coordinate
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GS_UAVRoutesAll{NegWinner}=
[GS_UAVRoutesAll{NegWinner}(1:UAVj_MovingTo1),TaskName,GS_UAVRoutesAll{NegWinner}(UAVj_MovingTo:end)];
GS_UAVRouteCordAll{i}(UAVi_MovingTo,:) = []; % delete
the task coordinate from tasklist
GS_UAVRoutesAll{i}(UAVi_MovingTo) = []; % delete the
task id from tasklist
% Uspdate the segmental lengths
[RouteLenghts{NegWinner},CumRouteLenghts{NegWinner}] =
ComputeSegmentDistance(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{NegWinner},GS_UAVRoutesAll{Ne
gWinner});
[RouteLenghts{i},CumRouteLenghts{i}] =
ComputeSegmentDistance(GS_UAVRouteCordAll{i},GS_UAVRoutesAll{i});
end
end
end
UAV_GSRoutesNeg =
UAV_GSRoutesCordNeg

GS_UAVRoutesAll;
= GS_UAVRouteCordAll;

File
function UAVsRoutePlot(UAVRouteCord,GS_ID,UAVs_Route)
global UAVsNames
% This function plots the routes for the UAVs
figure('Name',strcat('Ground Station',num2str(GS_ID)))
COLORS = ['r';'b';'g';'y';'k';'m';'c'];
for i = 1: length(UAVRouteCord)
UAVRouteCord{i} =real(UAVRouteCord{i});
if i<length(COLORS)+1
plot3(UAVRouteCord{i}(:,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(:,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(:,3),st
rcat(COLORS(i),'o-'))
text(UAVRouteCord{i}(1,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(1,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(1,3),str
cat('UAV',num2str(UAVsNames(UAVs_Route{i}(1,1)))))
text(UAVRouteCord{i}(end,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(end,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(end,
3),'GS')
hold on
else
plot3(UAVRouteCord{i}(:,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(:,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(:,3),'h
-')
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text(UAVRouteCord{i}(1,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(1,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(1,3),
strcat('UAV',num2str(UAVsNames(UAVs_Route{i}(1,1)))))
text(UAVRouteCord{i}(end,1),UAVRouteCord{i}(end,2),UAVRouteCord{i}(end,
3),'GS')
hold on
end
end
grid on
hold off
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